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ABSTRACT 
  The Supreme Court’s Daubert trilogy places judges in the 
unenviable position of assessing the reliability of often unfamiliar and 
complex scientific expert testimony. Over the past decade, scholars 
have therefore explored various ways of helping judges with their new 
gatekeeping responsibilities. Unfortunately, the two dominant 
approaches, which focus on doctrinal tests and external assistance 
mechanisms, have been largely ineffective. 
  This Article advocates for a neglected but important method for 
improving scientific decisionmaking—independent judicial research. 
It argues that judges facing unfamiliar and complex scientific 
admissibility decisions can and should engage in independent library 
research to better educate themselves about the underlying principles 
and methods. 
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  Independent research, however, is controversial. A survey of state 
appellate judges shows sharp divisions on the issue, and at the same 
time, the rules governing independent research are astonishingly 
unclear. The Article responds to the likely objections some judges 
have to independent research and also offers a way of interpreting the 
existing laws to permit the practice. 
  Finally, the Article assesses independent research’s chances for 
success as a method of scientific evidence reform. Based on the survey 
results, it concludes that a substantial number of judges will indeed 
take up the mantle of independent research. An equally substantial 
portion will likely resist, however, raising deeper issues about the 
importance of uniformity in judicial practice. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Scientific and other forms of expert evidence are crucially 
important to modern litigation. In today’s complex and 
technologically oriented society, scientific evidence surfaces in nearly 
every kind of litigation: products liability, medical malpractice, 
patents, criminal prosecution, and antitrust, just to name a few. 
Among other things, litigants use experts to prove causation, establish 
the standard of care, link suspects to (or exclude suspects from) crime 
scenes, and assess damages. 
Given the importance of scientific evidence, courts have 
unsurprisingly taken an active role in policing its flow into the 
courtroom. Most famously, the Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.1 tasked federal judges as all-important 
gatekeepers who are obligated to ensure that only “good” science 
reaches the jury.2 Many state supreme courts have subsequently 
followed suit. Judges may therefore no longer take a relaxed attitude 
toward the reception of scientific evidence, nor may they merely rely 
on an expert’s impressive credentials as a proxy for reliability. Rather, 
the Daubert regime requires that judges critically examine an expert’s 
methodology and conclusions with “exacting standards.”3 
Judges, however, face a conundrum. On the one hand, the 
scientific admissibility decision can be incredibly influential, if not 
outcome-determinative.4 After all, without an expert, a toxic tort 
plaintiff cannot prove causation, almost certainly sounding the death 
 
 1. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 2. Id. at 596–97. 
 3. Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 442 (2000). 
 4. Cf. Margaret A. Berger, Upsetting the Balance Between Adverse Interests: The Impact of 
the Supreme Court’s Trilogy on Expert Testimony in Toxic Tort Litigation, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 289, 308–21 (Spring/Summer 2001) (criticizing federal courts for ignoring the potential 
relationship between Daubert and Erie). 
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knell for the case. On the other hand, judges are remarkably ill-
positioned to make the decision. Primarily trained and seasoned in 
legal analysis, judges are usually unfamiliar with the specialized 
information presented and lack the background necessary to assess its 
reliability.5 At the same time, the experts, who are prescreened and 
hired by the parties, invariably conflict with each other, offering the 
judge little help. If one expert steadfastly maintains that toxicological 
studies on mice are a well-accepted method for determining 
carcinogenicity in humans, and the other expert flatly disagrees, how 
can the judge decide? 
Since Daubert, scientific evidence reformers have explored 
various ways to aid judges with their unenviable gatekeeping task. As 
Part I suggests, these approaches fall into three major categories. The 
most popular approach has been to provide judges with more 
direction through doctrinal tests, but studies have suggested that 
these efforts have had limited success. Another approach is to have 
judges seek outside help through court-appointed experts and similar 
mechanisms, but judges thus far have only reluctantly used them. A 
third approach is to focus on the judges themselves and their 
understanding of science. If judges can learn more about scientific 
principles and methods, then hopefully they can make more informed 
and accurate admissibility decisions. Sadly, this educative approach 
has received limited attention in the commentary,6 especially given 
that, in practice, it has become increasingly influential through 
judicial education programs. 
This Article explores a neglected but potentially important 
educative reform: independent judicial research. Ordinarily, 
responsible people facing an unfamiliar and specialized area do 
research; they read reference books and journal articles, and they 
search the Internet for relevant materials. This Article argues that 
judges should be encouraged to do the same. Library research can 
provide judges with the important background and other information 
 
 5. See McClain v. Metabolife Int’l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1233, 1237 (11th Cir. 2005) (describing a 
trial court that admitted expert testimony because it “concluded that it lacked sufficient 
knowledge on the scientific subject matter”); Craig Lee Montz, Trial Judges as Scientific 
Gatekeepers After Daubert, Joiner, Kumho Tire, and Amended Rule 702: Is Anyone Still 
Seriously Buying This?, 33 UWLA L. REV. 87, 110 (2001) (describing survey data showing that 
judges have little background in science). 
 6. See, e.g., Erica Beecher-Monas, Blinded by Science: How Judges Avoid the Science in 
Scientific Evidence, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 55, 74–75 (1998) (emphasizing the “continued need for 
appellate supervision and increased judicial education”). 
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necessary for their decision when they need it most. Unlike other 
educative reforms, however, independent research is controversial,7 
and a number of jurists have called for greater guidance on the issue.8 
Part II explores the debate in greater detail. It first reports the results 
of a recently conducted survey of state appellate judges on the issue 
of independent research. The survey shows a judiciary extremely 
divided, with roughly equal numbers of judges supporting 
independent research enthusiastically, denouncing it vehemently, and 
appearing undecided. Part II then responds to the two major 
objections to independent research: first, that independent research 
violates the fundamental tenets of the adversary system; and second, 
that lay judges could do incomplete or incompetent research and 
therefore reach distorted conclusions. 
Part III asks whether current law has the flexibility to permit 
independent research. Surprisingly, despite being a rather basic 
element of judicial practice, the rules governing independent research 
are astonishingly unclear. What little case law that exists is decidedly 
mixed, and the relevant statutory rules are ambiguous and in tension. 
Part III then offers an avenue for harmonizing the extant laws to 
permit independent research, although it ultimately concludes that 
only amendment of the relevant rules can truly clarify the ambiguities 
and solidify this position. 
Finally, Part IV assesses independent research’s chances for 
success as a method of scientific evidence reform. As law and social 
norms scholars teach us, doctrine alone is rarely enough to change 
behavior. Without supportive judicial norms, independent research 
would slowly die from neglect, just like many reforms before it. Part 
IV suggests that a substantial portion of judges will indeed take up 
the mantle of independent research, making it a potential success, but 
 
 7. See George D. Marlow, From Black Robes to White Lab Coats: The Ethical 
Implications of a Judge’s Sua Sponte, Ex Parte Acquisition of Social and Other Scientific 
Evidence During the Decision-Making Process, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 291, 298 (1998) (noting 
that Daubert or Frye will tempt judges to look outside the record, so this is “a particularly apt 
moment in legal history” to consider the issue of judicial research). 
 8. See C.T. Harhut, Ex Parte Communication Initiated by a Presiding Judge, 68 TEMP. L. 
REV. 673, 681 (1995) (writing that the case of In re Larsen, 616 A.2d 529 (Pa. 1992), “makes it 
abundantly clear that some judges are confused as to what they can discuss and with whom”); 
Marlow, supra note 7, at 298 (arguing that the time is right to “consider whether modern 
standards of judicial ethics should be adjusted to permit judges to engage in sua sponte, ex parte 
research while a case is pending”); Jack B. Weinstein, Limits on Judges Learning, Speaking and 
Acting—Part I—Tentative First Thoughts: How May Judges Learn?, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 539, 539–
40 (1994) (asking the broader question of how judges can ethically acquire knowledge). 
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that an equally substantial portion will also resist. Should the 
resulting inconsistency in judicial practice be troubling? The Part 
concludes that it should not. Although the rule of law generally 
prefers uniformity in practice, independent research is an instance in 
which the need for uniformity is attenuated and variation is 
acceptable. 
I.  THREE APPROACHES TO SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE REFORM 
As the Introduction describes, judges shoulder a great deal of 
responsibility in deciding scientific admissibility, yet they often lack 
the tools or expertise to make well-informed decisions. Accordingly, 
scientific evidence reform efforts since Daubert have often focused on 
solving this dilemma. This Part offers a framework for understanding 
these efforts, classifying them into three broad categories: doctrinal, 
external, and educative. As with most classification systems, these 
categories can overlap along the edges, but they nevertheless provide 
a useful tool for viewing the landscape of scientific evidence reform. 
Rather than focus on the doctrinal and external approaches, 
which have been largely unsuccessful, this Part argues that reformers 
should place greater emphasis on the educative approach, which 
teaches judges about scientific principles, methodologies, and 
developments. The educative approach has shown promise and could 
be a superior alternative—or at minimum, an important 
complement—to the other approaches. Independent judicial research 
is a critical element of this educative approach. 
A. The Doctrinal Approach 
The doctrinal approach to scientific evidence reform typically 
focuses on choosing and/or modifying the governing scientific 
admissibility standard. This approach attempts to reduce scientific 
inquiry to its essential attributes and to use the resulting multifactor 
test to guide judicial decisionmaking.9 For example, the Daubert 
decision itself established a four-factor test—falsifiability, peer 
review, error rates and standards, and general acceptance—for 
 
 9. But see Bert Black, Francisco J. Ayala & Carol Saffran-Brinks, Science and the Law in 
the Wake of Daubert: A New Search for Scientific Knowledge, 72 TEX. L. REV. 715, 751–52 
(1994) (arguing that it is a mistake to interpret Daubert as merely a four-factor test in light of 
how poorly “label and checklist approaches . . . have worked . . . in the past”). 
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determining scientific reliability.10 The earlier Frye11 standard focused 
solely on whether the expert’s methods were generally accepted in 
the relevant scientific community.12 
So far, the doctrinal approach has dominated attempts to 
improve scientific decisionmaking in the courts. Since the Daubert 
decision, countless articles have argued the merits of the four Daubert 
reliability factors, compared Daubert and Frye, and proposed 
additional factors for courts to consider.13 State supreme courts have 
debated whether to adopt Daubert, Frye, or some other admissibility 
standard,14 and a vast literature has emerged advocating along similar 
lines.15 
As it turns out, however, specific doctrinal tests may not matter 
much in practice. As a number of commentators and empirical studies 
have suggested, judges may be simply applying some general level of 
scrutiny to scientific evidence, regardless of the test.16 The possible 
reasons for this phenomenon are diverse, but most likely judges find 
 
 10. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593–94 (1993). The Daubert Court 
was careful to note that the four factors were nonexclusive, id. at 593, but in practice many 
courts have treated them as definitive. 
 11. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 12. Id. at 1014. 
 13. See, e.g., D.H. Kaye, Choice and Boundary Problems in Logerquist, Hummert, and 
Kumho Tire, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 41, 42 (2001) (“Much has been written about the merits, pedigree 
and operation of these standards. Each has its strengths and weaknesses, its friends and foes.”). 
 14. E.g., John v. Im, 559 S.E.2d 694, 698 (Va. 2002) (declining to adopt Daubert, yet not 
adopting Frye); Logerquist v. McVey, 1 P.3d 113, 125–29 (Ariz. 2000) (rejecting Daubert and 
retaining Frye); State v. Porter, 698 A.2d 739, 749–52 (Conn. 1997) (switching from Frye to 
Daubert). 
 15. E.g., Mary Gaston, Note, State v. Gentry: The Washington Supreme Court Opens the 
Door for Unreliable Scientific Evidence, 31 GONZ. L. REV. 475, 498–99 (1995–96) (proposing 
either modifications to Frye or an adoption of Daubert); Penelope Harley, Comment, Minnesota 
Decides: Goeb v. Tharalson and the Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence, 24 HAMLINE L. 
REV. 460, 463 (2001) (summarizing the argument that Minnesota should have switched from 
Frye to Daubert); Andrew R. Stolfi, Note, Why Illinois Should Abandon Frye’s General 
Acceptance Standard for the Admission of Novel Scientific Evidence, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 861, 
886–87 (2003). 
 16. E.g., 4 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 35-1.3.3 (2002) 
(doubting that admissibility rulings “actually turn on the difference between Daubert and 
Frye”); David E. Bernstein, Frye, Frye, Again: The Past, Present, and Future of the General 
Acceptance Test, 41 JURIMETRICS J. 385, 388 (2001) (observing that the “case law under Frye is 
slowly converging with Daubert jurisprudence”); Edward K. Cheng & Albert Yoon, Does Frye 
or Daubert Matter?: A Study of Scientific Admissibility Standards, 91 VA. L. REV. 471 (2005) 
(providing empirical evidence that the choice of admissibility standard does not affect the level 
of scrutiny imposed on scientific evidence). 
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doctrinal factors unhelpful in this context. Surveys17 and case law18 
have demonstrated that judges have a poor judicial understanding of 
the Daubert factors, which in many ways requires an unrealistic 
working knowledge of the philosophy of science. In addition, the 
breadth and diversity of expert testimony necessarily ensures that any 
discrete set of factors will often be a poor fit.19 Daubert itself 
recognized this problem in declaring its factors to be flexible and 
nonexclusive.20 Further amendments of the tests or other doctrinal 
tweaks are therefore unlikely to be successful. 
B. The External Approach 
The external approach to scientific evidence reform emphasizes 
the need for judges to seek outside help. Reformers who favor this 
class of solutions have typically sought to introduce a neutral expert 
or panel of experts into the litigation process. For example, Federal 
Rule of Evidence 706 and many states permit judges to use court-
appointed experts,21 and some judges have exercised their inherent 
judicial power to appoint technical advisers. One might also classify a 
number of National Research Council reports, most notably the 
seminal report on DNA typing, in this vein, although they tend to be 
very broad in scope and generally occur prior to litigation.22 
 
 17. Sophia I. Gatowski et al., Asking the Gatekeepers: A National Study of Judges on 
Judging Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 433, 444–48, 452–
53 (2001) (reporting survey results showing that judges have a poor understanding of the 
Daubert factors and rely heavily on the Frye “general acceptance” test). 
 18. For example, in United States v. Havvard, 260 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2001), the Seventh 
Circuit concluded that the district court “properly considered the Daubert factors . . . and 
concluded that fingerprinting techniques have been tested in the adversarial system, [and] that 
individual results are routinely subjected to peer review for verification,” id. at 601. This 
analysis is a patent distortion and misunderstanding of the falsifiability/testing and peer review 
factors. See, e.g., United States v. Llera Plaza, No. CR. 98-362-10, 2002 WL 27305, at *10–11 
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2002) (rejecting Havvard’s erroneous characterization), vacated on other 
grounds, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002). 
 19. For example, many forms of engineering expert testimony are based on reconstructions 
of unique events, creating problems for the testing, error rate, and general acceptance 
requirements. See, e.g., 3 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 16, § 21-1.3, at 9–12. 
 20. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593–94 (1993). 
 21. FED. R. EVID. 706; see also Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 147, 149–50 (Breyer, 
J., concurring) (supporting the use of court-appointed experts); Andrew MacGregor Smith, 
Note, Using Impartial Experts in Valuations: A Forum-Specific Approach, 35 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1241, 1269 & n.134 (1994) (listing twenty states with evidence provisions similar to Rule 
706). 
 22. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA 
EVIDENCE (1996). 
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In theory, external approaches offer a sensible if not optimal way 
of improving scientific admissibility decisions. External approaches 
provide judges with a knowledgeable aide who can properly digest 
the specialized information—and acquire additional information if 
necessary—in light of years of experience in the field. In addition, the 
external expert’s neutral position significantly reduces the problem of 
partisanship and bias that accompanies adversarial ones. Obviously, 
no expert is without biases, but at least court-appointed experts are 
not preselected and financially compensated specifically because of 
their biases. 
Despite their theoretical attractions, external mechanisms have 
unfortunately seen little use in practice.23 Albeit somewhat dated, a 
1994 Federal Judicial Center survey showed that despite having long-
standing authority to appoint experts, 80 percent of federal district 
court judges had never used one.24 Indeed, historically speaking, 
mechanisms for facilitating neutral experts either have been 
nonstarters or have inevitably faded away after garnering only some 
initial interest.25 
The reasons for the judicial lack of interest in external assistance 
are likely structural. Trusted, quality experts are difficult to find, 
particularly because judges typically travel in legal, not scientific, 
circles.26 Court-appointed experts are also administratively 
cumbersome, given that they are expensive and invariably involve 
 
 23. E.g., Debra L. Worthington et al., Hindsight Bias, Daubert, and the Silicone Breast 
Implant Litigation, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 154, 162 (2002) (noting that judges rarely use 
court-appointed experts); Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1113, 1191 
(same); see also James Oldham, The History of the Special (Struck) Jury in the United States and 
Its Relation to Voir Dire Practices, the Reasonable Cross-Section Requirement, and Peremptory 
Challenges, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 623, 659 (1998) (noting the resistance of Delaware trial 
judges to special juries despite a statutory provision permitting their use). 
 24. Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, Accepting Daubert’s Invitation: Defining a Role for 
Court-Appointed Experts in Assessing Scientific Validity, 43 EMORY L.J. 995, 1004–05 tbl.1 
(1994). 
 25. Edward K. Cheng, Same Old, Same Old: Scientific Evidence Past and Present, 104 
MICH. L. REV. 1387, 1395–96 (2006) (describing the historical efforts to promote neutral 
experts). 
 26. The recent Court Appointed Scientific Experts (CASE) program, a joint effort of the 
American Bar Association Science and Technology Section and the American Association for 
the Advancement of Science, attempts to address this concern by maintaining lists of experts. 
American Association for the Advancement of Science, CASE Mainpage, http://www.aaas.org/ 
spp/case/case.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2007). Historically, however, such list projects have 
proven unsuccessful. Cheng, supra note 25, at 1395–96. 
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delays and extra procedural steps.27 The trial bar vehemently opposes 
infringements on the adversary process, further contributing to 
judicial reluctance.28 Finally, judges may feel that the additional 
external actor improperly interferes with the judicial process. Because 
judges understandably tend to ratify their court-appointed experts’ 
opinions, the mechanism carries the appearance of delegation or 
abdication, however unwarranted that perception may be. 
C. The Educative Approach 
According to the educative approach, better scientific decisions 
will arise not from finely calibrated doctrinal tests or the use of 
external experts, but from a more sophisticated and well-informed 
judiciary. If judges have a more comprehensive appreciation and 
awareness of scientific problems, they will in turn make better 
scientific admissibility decisions.29 
The educative approach is a natural complement to Daubert’s 
gatekeeping philosophy. To improve the legal system’s handling of 
science, Daubert transferred power from the jury to the judge. But 
why would empowering judges over jurors improve science-related 
decisionmaking? Some might argue that judges are more intelligent 
or less plaintiff friendly, but one need not be so elitist or cynical. The 
more likely and palatable reason is that, unlike jurors, judges are 
repeat players.30 They know that scientific reliability is a critical and 
recurring issue in their courtrooms, so they are well motivated to 
learn about the scientific process and how to separate good science 
from bad.31 
 
 27. See generally Barbara S. Hulka et al., Experience of a Scientific Panel Formed to Advise 
the Federal Judiciary on Silicone Breast Implants, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 812 (2000) (describing 
the authors’ experience on the breast implants panel). 
 28. E.g., Gross, supra note 23, at 1197–98 (arguing that the neglect of Rule 706 is due in 
part to trial bar opposition and an adversarially focused judicial outlook). 
 29. As Ron Allen and Joseph Miller note, the common law has generally favored educating 
juries rather than having them “defer to the judgment of others,” an observation that somewhat 
parallels the educative versus external approaches described here. Ronald J. Allen & Joseph S. 
Miller, The Common Law Theory of Experts: Deference or Education?, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 1131, 
1133 (1993). 
 30. But see Note, Reliable Evaluation of Expert Testimony, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2142, 2150–
51 (2003) (expressing skepticism as to judges’ repeat-player advantages). 
 31. See Black et al., supra note 9, at 787–88 (discussing reasons why judges are preferable 
to jurors in the scientific evidence context); see also Ronald J. Allen, Expertise and the Daubert 
Decision, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1157, 1160–62 (1994) (observing that the costs of 
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At the same time, the educative approach can avert many of the 
problems that hamper the other approaches. Unlike external 
solutions, educative solutions keep decisionmaking power firmly 
entrenched with the judge and carry fewer administrative burdens. 
Unlike doctrinal reforms, educative solutions are more flexible and 
can be descriptively richer. Given the vast array of expert testimony, 
admissibility standards simply cannot be fine-tuned without creating 
tests that are excessively complicated and difficult to understand. The 
educative approach allows the admissibility standard to remain 
flexible by shifting some of the burden to the judge’s own 
understanding of science. 
Educative solutions can take place both before and during 
litigation. Before litigation, judges can seek out and attend judicial 
education programs on science. During litigation, practical limitations 
generally require judges to do library research independently. 
1. Judicial Education.  Most educative efforts so far have 
focused on judicial education prior to litigation. Over the last few 
years, judicial education programs on scientific evidence have become 
an increasingly popular option for judges and others interested in 
improving scientific decisionmaking. The programs range from the 
semiannual Science for Judges program,32 to weeklong courses at the 
National Judicial College,33 to more ad hoc panels at judicial 
conferences. Many of them are arranged by the judges themselves, 
whereas others are sponsored or sanctioned by judicial organizations 
such as the Federal Judicial Center and the National Center for State 
Courts.34 
Judicial education programs are a sound step toward improving 
the ability of judges to handle scientific evidence. They expose judges 
to scientific concepts and issues, and they make judges more critical 
 
educating jurors in scientific principles is high and recurs each time a specialized issue is 
litigated). 
 32. See, e.g., Margaret A. Berger, Science for Judges, 12 J.L. & POL’Y 1, 1–2 (2003) 
(announcing the Science for Judges program). The Science for Judges program has been an 
ongoing series since 2003. Id. at 1. 
 33. See The National Judicial College Courses: Scientific Evidence and Expert Testimony, 
http://www.judges.org/courses/evs0707.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2007). 
 34. Science for Judges, for example, is cosponsored by the Brooklyn Law School Center for 
Health, Science and Public Policy, the Federal Judicial Center, the National Center for State 
Courts, and the Committee of Science, Technology and Law of the National Academies of 
Science. Berger, supra note 32, at 1. 
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of expert testimony. Nevertheless, ex ante judicial education efforts 
have significant limitations. Educational programs must necessarily 
paint with a broad brush, and no series of programs can ever hope to 
anticipate the full range of scientific admissibility issues that a judge 
may face in the courtroom. These programs are also considerably 
removed in time; judges may need a refresher by the time a Daubert 
issue surfaces. Judges need a more specific and timely complement to 
judicial education to make the educative approach more effective. 
2. Independent Research.  The crucial complement to judicial 
education programs is independent judicial research. Allowing judges 
to educate themselves during the course of litigation through library 
and other research fills the sizable gap left by judicial education. 
Independent judicial research allows judges to obtain necessary 
information in a timely manner and at the appropriate level of 
specificity.35 In addition, written sources also provide stable, citable 
references, eliminating inaccurate or incomplete recollections from 
conferences long ago. 
Independent research is also a more readily available option than 
educational programs. Although educational programs may be more 
user-friendly because the materials and speakers are geared toward 
judicial issues, they are also limited in location, time, and topic. 
Independent research has none of these restrictions, particularly 
given that today’s networked world makes information incredibly 
easy to access.36 A judge can just as easily search the New England 
Journal of Medicine or some other science-related site as Westlaw or 
LEXIS. 
These arguments, of course, do not diminish the importance of 
judicial education programs, which remain an important component 
of the educative approach. Understanding scientific concepts takes 
 
 35. Concededly, independent research may not be as effective in this respect as court-
appointed experts, because court-appointed experts can be more responsive to specific 
questions and concerns. Court-appointed experts, however, have the disadvantage of being 
administratively cumbersome. See supra Part I.B. Furthermore, such experts, harboring their 
own personal biases, may not provide as balanced a treatment as a comprehensive literature 
review. 
 36. See, e.g., David H. Tennant & Laurie M. Seal, Judicial Ethics and the Internet: May 
Judges Search the Internet in Evaluating and Deciding a Case?, PROF. LAW., 2005, at 2 
(discussing judicial research on the Internet); Coleen M. Barger, On the Internet, Nobody 
Knows You’re a Judge: Appellate Courts’ Use of Internet Materials, 4 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 
417, 431–32 (2002) (discussing the increasing use of the Internet by judges to check facts); Molly 
McDonough, In Google We Trust?, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2004, at 30 (same). 
02__CHENG.DOC 6/7/2007  4:13 PM 
2007] INDEPENDENT JUDICIAL RESEARCH 1275 
time and exposure, and ex ante education programs offer judges the 
relaxed environment necessary to absorb the material. Perhaps even 
more importantly, educational programs familiarize judges with the 
research resources available, ultimately making independent research 
more productive. 
II.  THE CONTROVERSY OVER INDEPENDENT RESEARCH 
Unlike judicial education programs, which have been largely 
uncontentious and well received, independent research is likely to be 
controversial, in part because the idea of judges unilaterally doing 
research conflicts with widely held adversary system values. This Part 
addresses the controversy in greater detail. To paint a more vivid 
picture of the controversy, this Part begins by reporting the results of 
a 2005 survey of state appellate judges. It then asks why a sizable 
portion of judges reject independent research, and responds to the 
two likely objections: that the very idea of independent research does 
violence to adversary system values, and that judges will 
incompetently conduct research, undermining rather than improving 
accuracy. The Part closes with several limitations on how judges 
should conduct independent research to preserve adversarial values 
and to ensure greater accuracy. 
A. Survey of State Appellate Judges 
This Section reports the results of a survey of state appellate 
judges on the desirability of independent research in the Daubert 
context. Surveys, of course, have their inherent limitations, as will be 
discussed below. When trying to measure judicial attitudes, however, 
public data sources such as published opinions can have significant 
deficiencies. Published opinions, for instance, suffer from the 
distorting effects of controlling precedent, settlement, and publication 
decisions. Surveys are therefore a particularly useful method for 
ascertaining judicial attitudes in this context. 
1. Methods.  Surveys were distributed to a group of 136 state 
appellate judges attending a conference on Justice and Science 
sponsored by the National Foundation for Judicial Excellence.37 
 
 37. The conference was held in July 2005 in Chicago, Illinois. The National Foundation for 
Judicial Excellence is a foundation funded by the Defense Research Institute (DRI). Neither 
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Answers were anonymous, but the survey requested demographic 
information, such as the judges’ state and scientific background. The 
response rate was approximately 61 percent (N = 83).38 
To measure judicial attitudes, rather than controlling law, the 
survey asked participants to disregard any specific rules in their 
jurisdictions.39 The survey presented a scenario in which a judge faced 
a difficult scientific admissibility issue in a pharmaceutical products 
liability case. The survey then presented the judges with a variety of 
methods by which the hypothetical judge could obtain additional, 
independent information on the drug to inform his admissibility 
decision. The survey asked the judges to rate the desirability of each 
practice using a scale of 1 (very undesirable) to 5 (very desirable). 
The relevant portions of the survey instrument are reproduced in the 
Appendix. 
2. Results.  The survey results are revealing.40 For example, as 
shown in Figure 1, on the question whether it is desirable for a judge 
to “[f]ind and read medical journal articles (peer-reviewed) on the 
drug,” the judges (N = 81) were remarkably divided. Strikingly, 21 
percent of respondents found the research to be “very desirable,” 
whereas 25 percent of respondents found the very same practice to be 
“very undesirable.” Respondents were similarly divided on the issue 
of reading medical treatises, as seen in Figure 2. 
 
the conference organizers nor DRI played any role in survey construction or exercised any 
control over the ultimate reporting of results. 
 38. The judges returned eighty-three surveys, although as can be expected, surveys 
occasionally had blank or ambiguous answers, reducing the N for a particular question. 
 39. The survey instructed: “In responding to these questions, please disregard any specific 
rules in your jurisdiction that may govern or restrict judicial conduct. The purpose of this survey 
is to better understand what the rules or norms governing independent judicial investigations 
should be in principle, rather than what the restrictions currently are.” See infra app. 
 40. The results presented in this Article represent only a subset of the total data collected 
in the survey. The instrument covered a far broader range of topics, including independent 
research of law and general scientific principles, and a full spectrum of sources. A full analysis of 
the survey responses is beyond the scope of this Article and will be the subject of future work. 
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Figure 1.  Desirability of Judges Independently Reading Medical 
Journals 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judge’s Response 
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Figure 2.  Desirability of Judges Independently Reading Medical 
Treatises 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judge’s Response 
(1 = very undesirable; 5 = very desirable) 
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
1 2 3 4 5
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
of
 J
ud
ge
s
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
1 2 3 4 5
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
of
 J
ud
ge
s
02__CHENG.DOC 6/7/2007  4:13 PM 
1278 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 56:1263 
Only a few methods presented in the survey showed a relative 
consensus among judges, and these all involved informal 
conversations. A resounding 89 percent41 of judges responded that 
informally consulting a family physician was “very undesirable,” and 
88 percent42 of judges responded that informally consulting a medical 
school professor was to some degree undesirable.43 Strong judicial 
norms, likely developed through clear and well-established rules 
against ex parte communications, likely played a key role in 
generating uniform answers in these categories. 
3. Discussion and Limitations.  The survey results suggest that 
judges are divided on the propriety of independent research in 
scientific evidence cases. That said, however, the results carry the 
usual caveats that accompany surveys in general, as well as a few 
additional caveats unique to this survey. 
The response rate of approximately 61 percent, although quite 
reasonable, necessarily means that a significant number of conference 
participants are not represented in the survey results. Self-selection 
may therefore be a concern, particularly if judges who are more 
willing to assist academic research (by participating in the survey) are 
also more likely to welcome its use in the courtroom. Self-selection 
would bias results toward the “desirable” end of the spectrum. 
The original sample itself may also be a potential source of bias. 
Although distributing surveys at conferences may improve response 
rates, the method also necessarily limits the sample to those judges 
interested in the conference topic (or at minimum, willing to attend a 
conference on that topic). To the extent that judges who are willing to 
attend conferences on science and the law demonstrate an inclination 
toward judicial education, they may have more favorable views 
toward other educative mechanisms. 
A potential source of bias in the other direction may arise from 
the topic. Responses to ethical surveys may naturally skew toward the 
perceived ethical behavior, in this case the “undesirable” end of the 
spectrum.44 Despite the promise of anonymity, respondents may still 
feel that they have more to lose in appearing unethical than overly 
 
 41. The 95% confidence interval is 82% to 96%. 
 42. The 95% confidence interval is 81% to 95%. 
 43. Of all respondents, 67 percent rated informal discussions with a medical school 
professor as “1,” and 21 percent rated it as “2.” 
 44. Many thanks to Judge Arthur Kelsey for this insight. 
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cautious. The cost of being overzealous or overly permissive is clear. 
The implicit cost of being overly cautious—not conducting 
independent research and increasing the risk of error—is largely 
hidden and secondary. 
Nevertheless, although these biases may influence the precise 
percentages observed, they arguably do not affect the overall 
conclusion that conflict exists on these issues within the judiciary. 
First, some of the potential biases are subtle: neither a judge’s 
willingness to assist academic research nor a judge’s interest in 
judicial education necessarily correlates to views about independent 
research. Second, no matter what the bias, the surveys demonstrate 
that an appreciable subset of the judiciary believes that independent 
research is a good practice and another subset thinks it is a terrible 
one. 
A final concern is that despite clear instructions asking 
respondents to disregard the specific rules of their jurisdictions, 
judges’ opinions may have been influenced by those rules 
nonetheless. After all, as Part III.A suggests, roughly half of the states 
that have considered the issue permit judges to use medical articles 
independently, whereas the other half forbid it. If judges adhered to 
their jurisdictional rules, one might expect to see the distributions in 
Figures 1 and 2. 
Specific jurisdictional rules, however, probably did not exert 
much of an influence on the overall results. First, the vast majority of 
states have no controlling precedent on the issue.45 Second, as Part 
III.C discusses, nearly all states have adopted the ABA’s Model Code 
of Judicial Conduct or some close approximation of it, and those 
statutes leave the issue of independent research on scientific issues 
unexplored and ambiguous. Third, the survey results appear 
inconsistent with a jurisdictional influence theory whether via formal 
rules or informal norms. Performing a regression on the results shows 
no statistically significant relationship between a judge’s state and a 
judge’s attitude toward independent research. Indeed, responses 
within any given state varied widely. On the question of medical 
journal articles, the ten Texas judges distributed themselves across 
the scoring spectrum: 1, 1, 2, 3, 3, 4, 4, 4, 5, 5. The seven Louisiana 
judges also distributed themselves: 1, 2, 2, 3, 3, 4, 5. Other states 
 
 45. Unfortunately, there were an insufficient number of judges from jurisdictions with 
controlling precedent to determine if those rules had any impact on judicial attitudes. 
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displayed similar results. Finally, a previous survey on independent 
research suggests that most judges either do not know their specific 
jurisdictional rules or do not find them helpful. In his 1995 survey, 
Judge Chester Harhut of Pennsylvania found confusion and conflict 
on the issue of independent research among his colleagues on the 
Pennsylvania bench.46 Approximately half of those surveyed said that 
judges should not “fill in gaps left by counsel,” whereas the other half 
felt that a court has “a responsibility to bring additional facts out on 
the record when the litigants fall short.”47 
B. Objections to Independent Research 
Why are some judges so opposed to independent research? This 
Section raises and responds to two major objections that may be 
driving much of the resistance. The first objection is that independent 
research fundamentally conflicts with traditional adversarial process 
values. The second stems from skepticism about whether judges can 
really do independent research competently without being misled by 
outlier or spurious materials. 
1. Adversarial Process Objections.  Two fundamental 
components of the classic Anglo-American adversary system are a 
neutral and passive decisionmaker and party presentation of 
evidence.48 Independent research clashes with both. It involves an 
active decisionmaker, and it threatens to undermine the importance 
of the evidence presented by the parties.49 In all likelihood, judges 
 
 46. Harhut, supra note 8, at 683, 690. Judge Harhut surveyed 430 active and senior 
Pennsylvania trial judges. Id. at 682. 
 47. Id. at 690; see also id. at 685–86 (quoting one respondent: “Nor do I feel that a violation 
occurs when I perform independent research and investigation. After all, what’s the difference 
in reading a learned article in the New England Journal of Medicine and a case . . . ? I would, 
however, draw the line at formally seeking consultations with judges outside the country and 
other ‘experts.’”). 
 48. E.g., STEPHAN LANDSMAN, READINGS ON ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN 
APPROACH TO ADJUDICATION 1–5 (1988); Jerold H. Israel, Cornerstones of the Judicial 
Process, KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, Spring 1993, at 5, 12–13 (discussing the adversarial process in 
the criminal context); Stephan A. Landsman, A Brief Survey of the Development of the 
Adversary System, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 713, 714 (1983) (defining the adversarial system). 
Landsman’s definition also includes a third component, which he terms “highly structured 
forensic procedure” and which encompasses procedural, evidentiary, and ethical rules. Id. at 
716–17. 
 49. See Adam J. Siegel, Note, Setting Limits on Judicial Scientific, Technical, and Other 
Specialized Fact-Finding in the New Millennium, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 167, 200–01 (2000) 
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who strongly support and believe in the adversarial process—and 
many are in this category50—take a dim view of independent research. 
In the scientific evidence context, however, there are special 
justifications for sacrificing adversarial values. First, although the 
adversary system often improves accuracy,51 adversarialism may be 
ineffective or even counterproductive here. As countless 
commentators have pointed out, the adversary system is particularly 
ill suited to handle specialized knowledge. Experts are the only 
variety of witness that can be prescreened and paid by the parties, 
practically ensuring conflicting and partisan testimony.52 Worse yet, in 
the criminal context, indigent defendants lack the resources to hire 
their own experts, leaving prosecutorial forensic experts largely 
unchallenged.53 At the same time, judges and jurors typically have no 
background in the scientific or technical material presented. Passive 
decisionmakers who cannot supplement their background knowledge 
therefore lack the ability to assess the experts’ statements critically, a 
situation that is likely to produce arbitrary, not accurate, results.54 
Second, decisions involving scientific facts demand particular 
attention to accuracy because of their generalized nature. Unlike 
typical adjudicative facts such as who caused the accident at the 
intersection, third parties can readily scrutinize and check scientific 
 
(suggesting that judicial investigations will reduce the incentive for lawyers to describe science 
effectively to judges and jurors). 
 50. But see Landsman, supra note 48, at 713 (describing Chief Justice Burger and the 
drafters of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct as expressing doubts about some aspects of 
the adversary system). 
 51. E.g., Israel, supra note 48, at 13 (noting the theory that “self-interested adversaries will 
uncover and present more useful information . . . than would be developed by the judicial 
officer in an inquisitorial system”); Marlow, supra note 7, at 319 (noting that one reason for the 
adversary system is that it is more likely to be accurate). 
 52. MOLLY TREADWAY JOHNSON ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., EXPERT TESTIMONY IN 
FEDERAL CIVIL TRIALS: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 5 (2000) (describing a survey in which 
many federal judges felt that experts “abandon objectivity and become advocates for the side 
that hired them”); DAVID H. KAYE ET AL., THE NEW WIGMORE: EXPERT EVIDENCE § 1.2, at 
5–6 (2004). 
 53. See generally Paul C. Giannelli, Ake v. Oklahoma: The Right to Expert Assistance in a 
Post-Daubert, Post-DNA World, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1305 (2004) (discussing the right to 
expert assistance for criminal defendants). 
 54. See infra Part II.C; cf. Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding 
Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 54 (1901) (“[H]ow can the jury judge between two 
statements each founded upon an experience confessedly foreign in kind to their own? It is just 
because they are incompetent for such a task that the expert is necessary at all.”); Worthington 
et al., supra note 23, at 158 (describing a 1983 study concluding that jurors use an expert’s 
appearance and “paralanguage” as proxies for reliability). 
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findings, and well-publicized errors can call the legitimacy of the 
system into question. For example, when the court in Wells v. Ortho 
Pharmaceuticals Corp.55 notoriously concluded that spermicides 
caused birth defects,56 it incited a media frenzy over the mistake.57 
Furthermore, because scientific facts are general, the implications of 
erroneous decisions are not confined to the parties. Indeed, even if 
not technically binding precedent, previous decisions about scientific 
admissibility are cited in and arguably exert considerable influence 
over future cases.58 The parties therefore cannot claim sole ownership 
of the litigation. 
Third, the Daubert decision itself may signal the importance of 
relaxing adversarial process values in favor of accuracy in the 
scientific evidence context. Daubert was a response to the fervent 
criticism of “junk science” in the courtroom in the years preceding it.59 
Thus, it arguably marked the beginning of a new regime emphasizing 
accuracy. No longer are judges to be passive umpires, granting the 
parties largely unfettered control over the presentation of expert 
evidence to the jury. Instead, the judge must act as a gatekeeper and 
ensure that the evidence is reliable.60 The public, after all, expects 
courts to get the science right. 
Finally, it is worthwhile to note that independent research would 
not be alone as a countercurrent to adversarialism. Indeed, the 
 
 55. Wells v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 615 F. Supp. 262 (N.D. Ga. 1985). 
 56. Gross, supra note 23, at 1122; cf. Michael B. Bracken, Spermicidal Contraceptives and 
Poor Reproductive Outcomes: The Epidemiologic Evidence Against an Association, 151 AM. J. 
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 552, 552–56 (1985) (reviewing studies concluding that there is no 
association between spermicides and poor reproductive outcomes). 
 57. E.g., James L. Mills & Duane Alexander, Teratogens and “Litogens,” 315 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 1234 (1986); Editorial, Federal Judges v. Science, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1986, at A22. 
 58. See Miriam A. Cherry & Paul Decker, Daubert Hearings and Precedent, in THE 
JUDGE’S ROLE AS GATEKEEPER: RESPONSIBILITIES AND POWERS ch.9 (1999), available at 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/daubert/ch9.htm (discussing the precedential effect of previous 
admissibility decisions); Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in 
Toxic Substances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 NW. U. 
L. REV. 643, 679 (1992) (noting that in many Bendectin cases, courts substantially relied on 
earlier opinions in making their admissibility determinations, but qualifying that Bendectin may 
have been a unique situation). The influence of previous opinions, however, is only speculative, 
because it is impossible to separate the evidence’s substantive merits from the weight of prior 
judicial determinations. In other words, if the scientific evidence is indeed reliable, a court could 
admit it based on that fact alone, regardless of any prior precedent. 
 59. PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO’S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 17–20 
(1991). 
 60. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993). 
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judicial system often violates its own ideals of passivity and party 
control in the name of better decisionmaking. Judges can 
independently research law, in part because the resolution of a legal 
dispute affects subsequent parties and implicates societal values.61 
Modern judges have also taken a more active role in managing 
caseloads, encouraging settlement, and supervising injunctive relief.62 
In addition, various procedural, evidentiary, and ethics rules, 
including discovery, hearsay, and ethical disclosure rules, exist 
specifically to rein in the excessive zeal and perverse effects that 
might otherwise accompany a purely adversarial system. 
2. “Half-Baked” Research Objections.  Another concern about 
independent research is whether judges will have the wherewithal to 
conduct first-rate library research. Judges have limited resources for 
conducting specialized research, both in terms of personnel and 
access.63 They also lack experience and expertise in the relevant 
scientific fields. Judges therefore always run the risk of missing 
important information or being duped by outlier, polemical, or 
otherwise discredited material. 
A few considerations should allay these fears. First, when 
conducting independent research, judges have a natural inclination 
toward standard, reliable sources. These sources (if not already cited 
by the parties) are more likely to come to mind as reference sources 
and are more readily available from the library. Of course, the 
Internet is a wild card in this regard, but then again, judges have 
considerable incentives to avoid dubious sources like blogs or 
personal websites. Judges must produce publicly available, written 
decisions, and the use of fringe sources risks undermining the 
persuasive power of their opinions, let alone their reputations. 
 
 61. United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 246 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The rule that 
points not argued will not be considered . . . distinguishes our adversary system of justice from 
the inquisitorial one. Even so, . . . the Supreme Court need not render judgment on the basis of 
a rule of law whose nonexistence is apparent on the face of things, simply because the parties 
agree upon it—particularly when the judgment will reinforce error already prevalent in the 
system.” (citation omitted)). But see Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U.S. 59, 63–64 (1912) 
(Holmes, J.) (declining to explore the possibility of discrimination when counsel does not raise, 
or indeed disclaims, the issue). 
 62. E.g., Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 376–80 (1982). 
 63. To the extent that time and resources constrain the ability of judges to conduct 
independent research in all cases, independent research can only be a partial solution to judges’ 
unfamiliarity with science and must be accompanied by other educative solutions. 
02__CHENG.DOC 6/7/2007  4:13 PM 
1284 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 56:1263 
Second, the structural context cabins and directs the judge’s 
independent research, reducing the possibility of misguided research 
and decisions. Independent judicial research supplements the parties’ 
presentation of scientific information, rather than replaces it, so the 
parties still frame the debate. The judge’s inquiry is therefore 
naturally bounded by the limits set by the parties. Within these 
bounds, independent research contextualizes the parties’ experts and 
helps the judge be more critical about them. 
Finally, because the judge’s purview is restricted to admissibility, 
the judge’s role is necessarily limited to excluding or admitting the 
parties’ evidence. This posture ensures that even under the absolute 
worst-case scenario—for example, when the judge finds and 
mistakenly relies upon an outlier article—the damage is confined to 
erroneous exclusion or admission. This result is arguably no worse 
than a regime without independent research, in which passive judges 
without adequate tools for determining reliability are consistently 
forced to guess anyway. 
C. Potential Limits on Independent Research 
Although the discussion in Section B strongly suggests that fears 
about adversarial process encroachment and poor quality research 
are insufficient to exclude independent research as an avenue for 
reform, one should not take those objections lightly. Indeed, those 
concerns advocate for several procedural safeguards that would 
promote greater accuracy and maintain many of the benefits of 
adversarial testing. 
First, judges should restrict their independent research only to 
sources that are citable and publicly available. This requirement 
ensures that the parties can continue to contest the influences on the 
judge’s reasoning. Under this limitation, judges may consider 
scientific information found in case law, library materials, and some 
Internet sites.64 They may not engage in ex parte communications 
with experts and other third parties, however, although one might 
argue that such conversations would qualify if transcribed for the 
record.65 
 
 64. See Barger, supra note 36, at 431–37 (discussing the problem of fleeting sources on the 
Internet). 
 65. See Weinstein, supra note 8, at 557–59 (discussing the importance of creating a record if 
judges need to talk to outside parties). 
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Second, judges should cabin their inquiry to generally applicable 
scientific information such as scientific principles and methods, the 
toxic effects of a substance, or the accuracy of a scientific technique. 
As noted in Section B, these generalized facts are not confined to the 
immediate parties, heightening the need for greater accuracy in 
decisionmaking. These facts are also likely to be more useful to the 
Daubert inquiry, given that they help judges ascertain whether an 
expert has addressed methodological concerns and/or contrary 
studies. Judges, however, should avoid researching case-specific facts, 
such as whether the plaintiff was actually exposed to a substance or 
how the DNA test was conducted in a particular instance.66 This 
restriction is largely self-policing, as library and other publicly 
available sources will generally not contain case-specific information. 
Finally, as generations of commentators have argued in the 
legislative fact context,67 when judges discover information critical to 
the decisionmaking process, the parties should be notified and given 
an opportunity to respond.68 This procedural safeguard further 
minimizes the concern about “half-baked” judicial research, because 
it enables the parties to double-check the judge.69 
III.  INDEPENDENT RESEARCH AND CURRENT LEGAL DOCTRINE 
Assuming that having judges engage in independent research is a 
desirable goal, does current law permit it? One would think that such 
a fundamental aspect of the judicial process would have clear and 
well-established rules, but it does not. Indeed, the answer is 
surprisingly unclear and controversial. The few courts that have 
addressed the issue are split, with some approving and others 
denouncing it. At the same time, the relevant statutory texts—the 
evidentiary and judicial ethics rules—are equally ambiguous and 
 
 66. See id. at 556 (arguing for greater care when a judge acquires case-specific knowledge 
than when a judge acquires more general knowledge). 
 67. E.g., Peggy C. Davis, “There is a Book Out . . .”: An Analysis of Judicial Absorption of 
Legislative Facts, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1539, 1598 (1987) (encouraging judges to allow party 
participation when the facts found are central to outcome); Kenneth Culp Davis, Facts in 
Lawmaking, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 931, 941–42 (1980) (criticizing the lack of opportunity for the 
parties to respond to new legislative facts). 
 68. E.g., Marlow, supra note 7, at 291; see also Ficic v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 804 
N.Y.S.2d 541, 547 & n.1 (Sup. Ct. 2005) (adopting Marlow’s view that counsel should be offered 
an opportunity to comment on independent research); Davis, supra note 67, at 1598. 
 69. Weinstein, supra note 8, at 560 (“It is dangerous for the court to rely on scientific 
evidence and not let the parties know.”). 
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potentially in tension with one another. This Part takes a closer look 
at both the case law and the underlying evidentiary and judicial ethics 
rules. It also suggests a way to resolve the ambiguities to permit 
independent research in the scientific evidence context, although it 
ultimately concludes that amending the relevant statutes would be far 
more preferable. 
A. Conflicting Case Law 
Few cases have explicitly addressed the issue of independent 
research, and even fewer have dealt with independent research in the 
scientific admissibility context. Nevertheless, the existent case law 
readily demonstrates a division among courts. 
A number of cases have approved independent research, either 
explicitly or implicitly by engaging in it.70 For example, in Johnson v. 
United States,71 the Eleventh Circuit approved a trial judge’s use of 
medical journal articles on iron poisoning prior to hearing the expert 
testimony.72 The court remarked that “[i]t is a matter of common 
knowledge that courts occasionally consult sources not in evidence, 
ranging anywhere from dictionaries to medical treatises.”73 Similarly, 
in Samuels v. Mladineo,74 the Mississippi Supreme Court refused to 
declare its own extra-record use of medical treatises improper, 
observing that many appellate courts use treatises to familiarize 
themselves with a field of expert testimony.75 Indeed, the Samuels 
court declared that if a case involved expert knowledge and the 
record was opaque, it would “not hesitate to conduct authoritative 
study on [its] own.”76 
 
 70. E.g., Ficic, 804 N.Y.S.2d at 546–47 (researching arson investigation methodologies and 
subsequently excluding arson expert); State v. O’Key, 899 P.2d 663, 686 (Or. 1995) (en banc) 
(conducting its “own research” on the Horizontal Gaze Nysagmus test used to determine 
intoxication); see also Marlow, supra note 7, at 307 (discussing O’Key and State v. Marcus, 683 
A.2d 221 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996), in which the court cited a National Research Council 
prepublication report on DNA that was released subsequent to the hearing). 
 71. Johnson v. United States, 780 F.2d 902 (11th Cir. 1986). 
 72. Id. at 909–10. The Eleventh Circuit’s discussion is technically dicta because it held the 
issue procedurally defaulted, but it clearly appeared unperturbed by the district judge’s 
behavior. Id. at 910. 
 73. Id. at 910. 
 74. Samuels v. Mladineo, 608 So. 2d 1170 (Miss. 1992) (en banc). 
 75. Id. at 1183–84 (noting that the court is not confined to the record when trying to 
understand testimony). 
 76. Id. at 1186. 
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In sharp contrast, other courts have found the use of extra-record 
treatises to be an anathema. In Prestige Homes, Inc. v. Legouffe,77 the 
Colorado Supreme Court reversed and reprimanded the intermediate 
appellate court for using medical treatises outside the record to assess 
whether an electric shock could cause serious injury without leaving a 
burn mark.78 Similarly, in In re J.,79 the Vermont Supreme Court 
reversed an adoption decision in which the trial court quoted 
extensively from a child psychology treatise that was not part of the 
record.80 
Even within a particular court jurists appear split, and one 
suspects that little precedential weight is accorded to previous 
conclusions on the issue. One such example is Hernandez v. State,81 a 
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals case in which the State had failed to 
present evidence at trial demonstrating the reliability of its test for 
marijuana.82 The majority decision was largely unexceptional,83 but the 
concurrence and dissent were strikingly at odds. In his concurrence, 
Presiding Judge Keller categorically stated that “appellate courts 
should never conduct their own independent research of the scientific 
literature.”84 Her concurrence criticized treatise research as providing 
potentially incomplete information and lacking the benefits of live 
testimony and cross-examination.85 Judge Keasler strongly dissented, 
arguing that the court should be permitted to look at “any reliable 
 
 77. Prestige Homes, Inc. v. Legouffe, 658 P.2d 850 (Colo. 1983) (en banc). 
 78. Id. at 854 (holding that the appellate court “in effect assumed the role of an expert 
medical witness” because it used a treatise “which properly should be interpreted only by 
experts in the appropriate field”). 
 79. In re J., 365 A.2d 521 (Vt. 1976). 
 80. Id. at 522 (noting that the court had previously expressed its reservations about the use 
of extra-record treatises). 
 81. Hernandez v. State, 116 S.W.3d 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (en banc). 
 82. Id. at 30–31. Notably, Texas uses a heightened “clear and convincing evidence” 
standard to assess scientific reliability in criminal cases. Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568, 573 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 1992) (en banc). 
 83. The majority held that the trial court had abused its discretion in admitting the 
evidence without any proof of reliability from the prosecution. It also rejected and criticized the 
prosecution’s attempt to introduce scientific articles at the appellate stage, and further 
remarked that the State could not “rely upon the appellate courts to become independent 
scientific sleuths to ferret out the appropriate scientific materials.” Hernandez, 116 S.W.3d at 
30–31. 
 84. Id. at 32 (Keller, P.J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 85. Id. at 32–33 (remarking that the Judge “trust[s] cross-examination more” than judicial 
research). Presiding Judge Keller’s strong position also rested on her vision of the proper role of 
appellate review, but most of her reasoning applied to all levels of the hierarchy. Id. at 33. 
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authority it could locate,” regardless of whether it was presented on 
the record.86 
These reported decisions represent only the proverbial tip of the 
iceberg, given that most trial court decisions are unpublished,87 and 
many cases settle after the Daubert hearing88 or otherwise never make 
it to the appellate level. Worse yet, independent judicial research is 
often hidden from view. The parties have no natural method of 
detecting it, and although particularly conscientious judges may 
disclose and discuss the new material with the parties, overburdened 
and harried judges may not.89 Indeed, in jurisdictions in which the 
propriety of such research is unclear, trial judges have a distinct 
incentive not to disclose for fear of reversal (or worse yet, sanction). 
The parties may also be reluctant to contest the research, hoping to 
avoid direct confrontation with the judge. Consequently, few cases 
explicitly discuss the judicial research issue despite its growing 
importance. 
Splits in the case law are often the result of statutory ambiguity, 
and independent research is no different. As the following Sections 
suggest, ambiguities and tensions in the evidentiary and judicial ethics 
rules contribute to the lack of clarity in this area. 
B. Evidentiary Rules 
Rules 104(a) and 201 are the two provisions of the Federal Rules 
of Evidence most relevant to the issue of independent research. In 
 
 86. Id. at 43, 49–50 (Keasler, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Judge Keasler further noted 
that trial courts were no better than appellate courts at assessing scientific validity, and that 
appellate review should therefore be de novo. Id. at 51. 
 87. Bernstein, supra note 16, at 389 (recognizing that “most state court opinions, 
particularly at the trial court level, are unpublished”). 
 88. See Berger, supra note 4, at 293 (noting that defendants quickly realized after Daubert 
that the optimal defense strategy is “to seek pretrial rulings on the admissibility of expert 
testimony and to follow a favorable result with a motion for summary judgment” (footnote 
omitted)); Bert Black, Focus on Science, Not Checklists, TRIAL, Dec. 2003, at 24, 24 (“[A] 
plaintiffs’ win at a Daubert hearing can change the dynamics of a case and push defendants 
toward a reasonable settlement.”). 
 89. For example, as Judge Weinstein recounts: 
I file and docket everything I read that is related to my Agent Orange and asbestos 
cases so that the parties can become aware of the information that might in some way 
affect my decision. There is, however, a limit to what can be disclosed to the parties in 
pending suits. 
Weinstein, supra note 8, at 559. 
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tandem, they suggest that judges facing Daubert questions are 
released from any restrictions on independent investigations. 
Before exploring the rules in detail, a caveat is in order. 
Individual states, of course, may have evidentiary rules that deviate 
from the federal scheme. A significant majority of states, however, 
have specifically incorporated both 104(a) and 201 into their 
evidentiary rules.90 Even among states that have not, the Federal 
Rules exert influence as a quasi-model code, much like Daubert 
itself.91 
1. Rule 104(a).  In determining scientific admissibility questions, 
judges are governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a),92 which 
states that the court “is not bound by the rules of evidence except 
those with respect to privileges.”93 Judges deciding scientific 
admissibility questions can therefore evade some obstacles that would 
ordinarily hinder their ability to do independent research. For 
example, the hearsay rule94 would usually bar the consideration of 
medical journals or treatises, except under the strictures of the 
 
 90. See Thomas J. Reed, Admitting the Accused’s Criminal History: The Trouble with Rule 
404(b), 78 TEMP. L. REV. 201, 212 & n.69 (2005) (“Forty-one states, the District of Columbia, 
the Virgin Islands, and Guam have adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence in one form or 
another.”). 
 91. For example, New York’s evidentiary law remains common law, but the major treatise 
often references the Federal Rules and their advisory committee notes. See RICHARD T. 
FARRELL, PRINCE, RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE § 2-210, at 46 (11th ed. 1995) (referencing 
Federal Rule of Evidence 201 in its discussion of the judicial notice of legislative facts). 
 92. E.g., David L. Faigman et al., Check Your Crystal Ball at the Courthouse Door, Please: 
Exploring the Past, Understanding the Present, and Worrying about the Future of Scientific 
Evidence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1799, 1817 (1994). One potential technical complication is 
whether issues of “fit” qualify under 104(a). Daubert, of course, established four factors for 
determining the reliability of expert evidence: falsifiability, peer review, standards and error 
rates, and general acceptance. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593–94 
(1993). However, Judge Becker’s question of “fit,” or “whether the proffered testimony [is] 
sufficiently tied to the facts of the case,” is generally regarded to be the fifth Daubert factor. 
Downing v. United States, 753 F.2d 1224, 1226 (3d Cir. 1985) (Becker, J.); see also Daubert, 509 
U.S. at 591 (including the fit inquiry in the Daubert analysis). The question of fit seems more a 
question of relevance to be decided under Rule 104(b), rather than one of reliability to be 
decided under Rule 104(a). See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591 (describing the fit inquiry as related to 
relevance). Rule 104(b), as a conditional relevancy rule, arguably restricts the judge only to 
admissible evidence. 
 93. FED. R. EVID. 104(a). 
 94. FED. R. EVID. 801(c), 802. 
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learned treatise exception.95 Judges deciding Daubert-type questions, 
however, need not worry. 
One commentator has taken this argument one step further, 
arguing that 104(a) by implication authorizes judges to conduct 
independent research,96 but this position seems a bit extreme. At best, 
Rule 104(a) is ambiguous on the issue of independent judicial 
research. Just because judges may consider otherwise inadmissible 
journal articles does not necessarily mean that the judges may acquire 
the articles on their own. The parties, for example, may submit the 
articles along with their motions in limine. Thus, although Rule 
104(a)’s liberal spirit may contribute to an environment favorable to 
independent research, it cannot do all of the work. 
2. Rule 201.  Federal Rule of Evidence 201 governs judicial 
notice, and it too is ambiguous, although potentially favorable, in its 
treatment of independent research. The key problem here is whether 
the scientific information acquired by judges in the Daubert context 
qualifies as adjudicative or legislative fact. Rule 201 highly restricts 
judicial notice of adjudicative facts, requiring that they not be 
“subject to reasonable dispute.”97 For adjudicative facts, the Advisory 
Committee Notes suggest that “[a] high degree of indisputability is 
the essential prerequisite.”98 Judicial notice of legislative facts, by 
contrast, is basically unregulated. The Advisory Committee adopted 
Edmund Morgan’s view on legislative facts, which would leave the 
judge “unrestricted in his investigation and conclusion [of legislative 
facts] . . . . He may make an independent search for persuasive data or 
rest content with what he has or what the parties present.”99 
Made famous by Kenneth Culp Davis,100 the distinction between 
legislative and adjudicative facts has been much maligned for being 
 
 95. See FED. R. EVID. 803(18) (permitting the use of journals and treatises only if relied 
upon or used against an expert witness, and requiring that the statements only be read into 
evidence, not received as exhibits). 
 96. Siegel, supra note 49, at 175–76. Siegel ultimately argues that the breadth of Rule 
104(a) is harmful and advocates for amending the rule to make it more restrictive. Id. at 213. 
 97. FED. R. EVID. 201(b) (further defining lack of reasonable dispute to mean that the fact 
is either “generally known” or “capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to 
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned”). 
 98. FED. R. EVID. 201(a) advisory committee’s note. 
 99. Id. (quoting Edmund Morgan, Judicial Notice, 57 HARV. L. REV. 269, 270 (1944)); see 
also id. (“This is the view which should govern judicial access to legislative facts.”). 
 100. Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative 
Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402 (1942). 
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incomplete.101 And predictably, whether generally applicable scientific 
facts used to inform admissibility decisions constitute legislative or 
adjudicative facts is unclear. On the one hand, they are not really 
adjudicative facts. Scientific facts, such as whether a chemical causes 
cancer or whether fingerprints are a reliable method of identification, 
are general truths that affect a multitude of cases, not “simply the 
facts of the particular case.”102 Questions about specific causation 
(whether the plaintiff was exposed to the chemical)103 or the particular 
application of a methodology (whether the fingerprint examiner 
observed proper protocol) involve adjudicative facts, but as noted in 
Part II.C, judges should not conduct independent research on these 
questions. Additionally, the materials that a judge is likely to find in a 
library or on the Internet are unlikely to help resolve case-specific 
questions.104 
On the other hand, the scientific facts found in treatises and 
journal articles are not necessarily legislative facts either. They are not 
being used to ascertain legislative intent nor to determine “the 
content or applicability of a rule of domestic law.”105 When making a 
Daubert-type admissibility determination, judges are not debating the 
admissibility standard itself. Rather, judges use independent research 
to inform the application of that standard, arguably a mixed question 
of law and fact. 
 
 101. See John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and 
Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 485–86 (1986) (criticizing the 
legislative fact distinction for providing judges with no guidance, particularly on “the difficult 
question whether a court should independently search for scientific research when it appears 
relevant to the decision but has not been presented by the parties”). To address these perceived 
deficiencies, Monahan and Walker argue that social science should be treated analogously to 
legal precedents. Id. at 488. 
 102. FED. R. EVID. 201(a) advisory committee’s note (defining adjudicative facts); see also 
In re School Asbestos Litigation, No. 83-0268, 1991 WL 175819, at *3 & n.6 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 
1991) (noting that whether “asbestos is hazardous” fits awkwardly into the legislative and 
adjudicative fact categories). But see Laster v. Celotex Corp., 587 F. Supp. 542, 543 (S.D. Ohio 
1984) (“Clearly, the facts pertaining to whether asbestosis and mesothelioma are caused by 
exposure to asbestos are ‘adjudicative facts’ under Rule 201.”). 
 103. For general background on the distinction between general and specific causation, see 
Michael D. Green et al., Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 333, 381–82 (2d ed. 2000). 
 104. See Neal C. Stout & Peter A. Valberg, Bayes’ Law, Sequential Uncertainties, and 
Evidence of Causation in Toxic Tort Cases, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 781, 872 (2005) (noting 
that determining specific causation requires a medical expert who can review, inter alia, the 
patient’s medical history). 
 105. FED. R. EVID. 201(a) advisory committee’s note (quoting Morgan, supra note 99, at 
270). 
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In the end, whether scientific facts should be classified as 
legislative or adjudicative may boil down to an analysis about the 
proper roles of judge and jury.106 Adjudicative facts, of course, are 
quintessential jury questions, because the judge determines these 
facts only when they are indisputable (through the mechanism of 
judicial notice). Legislative facts, in contrast, are determined by the 
judge without deference to the jury. With the distinction viewed in 
this way, the generalized scientific facts used in Daubert decisions 
seem clearly legislative. First, Daubert’s concept of judge as 
gatekeeper is fundamentally infused with skepticism toward the jury, 
suggesting that the judge should not be deferential in this context. 
Second, from an evidentiary standpoint, scientific admissibility is a 
question not of relevance, but of reliability. Judges determine 
relevancy issues under Rule 104(b), which defers considerably to the 
jury;107 judges determine reliability issues under Rule 104(a), which 
does not.108 
Finally, good reasons exist for why judges should not defer to 
juries in this context. Scientific admissibility decisions demand not 
only accuracy109 but also some degree of uniformity, as having 
different rulings on the same issue from one case to another may have 
a delegitimizing effect.110 Unlike juries, judges can consider prior 
precedent from other courts and harmonize their decisions 
accordingly.111 Concededly, although perhaps sound in theory, this last 
 
 106. Cf. Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction, 97 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1769, 1769–70 (2003) (arguing that the law-fact distinction is based purely on 
functional considerations, including whether the question should be decided by a judge or a jury 
and whether the question has general or specific import). 
 107. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 689–90 (1988) (establishing that the 
standard for conditional relevance under 104(b) is whether “the jury could reasonably find the 
conditional fact”). 
 108. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175–76 (1987) (establishing a preponderance 
standard for 104(a) questions); see also State v. O’Key, 899 P.2d 663, 682 n.35 (Or. 1995) (en 
banc) (reasoning that because scientific admissibility is a question of law, the facts used to 
determine admissibility questions are legislative facts). 
 109. See supra Part II.B.1; cf. Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., A Trial Judge’s Freedom and 
Responsibility, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1293–94 (1952) (suggesting that when a legal rule may 
have the effect of binding many other parties not represented in the litigation, the court has a 
responsibility to ensure that “the record corresponded with reality”). 
 110. 1 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 16, § 1-3.6, at 58–59 (noting that to allow conclusions 
about the validity of a scientific process to vary from case to case “would strike most observers 
as patently irrational”). 
 111. See supra note 58 (discussing courts that rely on prior precedent in making scientific 
admissibility determinations). 
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proposition is weakened by General Electric Co. v. Joiner,112 which 
established an abuse of discretion standard for appellate review of 
Daubert determinations.113 An abuse of discretion standard, of course, 
hampers the establishment of uniform scientific admissibility rulings. 
And although many commentators have argued that such deferential 
review is inappropriate,114 it still suggests that the Supreme Court may 
not be too concerned about uniformity in this context.115 
In any event, the functional analysis at least suggests that the 
scientific facts used for Daubert determinations should be treated as 
legislative facts. If one takes the Advisory Committee’s adoption of 
the Morgan view seriously, this conclusion means that the Federal 
Rules free judges to do independent research in the Daubert context. 
C. Judicial Ethics Rules 
The canons of judicial ethics prohibit behavior such as ex parte 
communications, independent factual investigations, and possessing 
personal knowledge of the facts. As this Section suggests, it is unclear 
whether these provisions apply to independent research on scientific 
admissibility questions. Unlike the evidentiary rules, however, the 
tenor of the ethics rules seems to discourage judicial research. 
As with evidentiary rules, ethics rules vary among the states. In 
this area, however, the states have almost uniformly adopted the 
ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, particularly the provisions 
most relevant to this Article.116 For example, in his exhaustive survey 
of state ethics rules on ex parte communications, Leslie Abramson 
 
 112. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
 113. Id. at 141 (“[A]buse of discretion is the proper standard of review of a district court’s 
evidentiary rulings.”). But see Peter Nicolas, De Novo Review in Deferential Robes?: A 
Deconstruction of the Standard of Review of Evidentiary Errors in the Federal System, 54 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 531, 532–40 (2004) (arguing that the standard of review governing 
evidentiary rulings is more complicated in practice). 
 114. E.g., 1 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 16, § 1-3.6, at 58–59 (criticizing the use of an abuse 
of discretion standard for all scientific admissibility rulings regardless of their level of 
generality); see also id. § 1-3.6, at 56 & n.202 (noting that Joiner conflicts with a “long standing 
practice . . . of treating decisions about the fundamental admissibility of scientific evidence as a 
matter of law”). 
 115. Joiner, however, has arguably not been as well received as Daubert among the states. 
See David E. Bernstein & Jeffrey D. Jackson, The Daubert Trilogy in the States, 44 
JURIMETRICS J. 351, 356–57 (2004) (reporting that some states have adopted Daubert but “not 
fully adopted Joiner”). 
 116. See Harhut, supra note 8, at 674–65 (noting that “[m]ost states and the federal courts 
have adopted some version” of the ABA Code). 
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reports that forty-six states have adopted some version of the ABA 
Model Code: thirty-four states have language identical or similar to 
the 1990 Model Code,117 and twelve states and the federal courts have 
provisions tracking a rather similar 1972 version.118 The remaining 
four states have provisions based on or comparable to the original 
1924 ABA Canons of Judicial Ethics,119 which have a similar thrust.120 
The Model Code therefore provides a convenient and 
appropriate focal point for this analysis. Though it is not always the 
precise provision adopted, it is the best available guide, especially 
because no state ethics committee appears to have ruled explicitly on 
the issue of independent research in the Daubert context.121 
1. Ex Parte Communications.  Outside of a few narrowly 
defined exceptions,122 both the 1990 revision and the original 1972 
version of the Model Code flatly prohibit judges from engaging in ex 
parte communications: 
A judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte 
communications, or consider other communications made to the 
 
 117. Leslie W. Abramson, The Judicial Ethics of Ex Parte and Other Communications, 37 
HOUS. L. REV. 1343, 1352 n.19 (2000) (noting also that “most states have adopted most or all” 
of the accompanying commentary). 
 118. Id. at 1348–49 n.16; see also Code of Conduct for United States Judges, 150 F.R.D. 307, 
310–11 (1992). 
 119. Abramson, supra note 117, at 1347 n.14 (discussing Massachusetts, New Hampshire, 
Louisiana, and Rhode Island). 
 120. See CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 17 (1924) (“A judge should not permit 
private interviews, arguments or communications designed to influence his judicial action, 
where interests to be affected thereby are not represented before him . . . .”), reprinted in LISA 
L. MILORD, AM. BAR ASS’N, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA JUDICIAL CODE 131, 136 
(1992). 
 121. For his 1998 article, Judge George Marlow contacted all thirty-nine state ethics 
committees and found that there were no formal ethics opinions on the issue. Marlow, supra 
note 7, at 302. The federal ethics rules also have no explicit provision, Siegel, supra note 49, at 
197, and no federal advisory opinion exists on the issue, see E-mail from Joe Cecil, Fed. Judicial 
Ctr., to author (Jan. 23, 2006) (on file with author). 
 122. Under the 1990 Code, exceptions to the ex parte prohibition are available for handling 
certain administrative matters, for seeking the advice of “a disinterested expert on the law,” for 
consulting court personnel, for conducting settlement negotiations, and when such 
communications are specifically authorized by law. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
Canon 3B(7)(a)–(e) (1990). The 1972 Code only had the disinterested legal expert and specific 
authorization exceptions, MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3A(4) (1972), although 
the 1990 Code additions were arguably only “to provide greater clarity and to explicitly 
acknowledge” exceptions left unaddressed or ambiguous by the 1972 code, see ABA 
ANNOTATED MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 129–30 (Arthur Garwin ed., 2004) 
[hereinafter ANNOTATED MODEL CODE]. 
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judge outside the presence of the parties concerning a pending or 
impending proceeding . . . .123 
[Judges should] neither initiate nor consider ex parte or other 
communications concerning a pending or impending proceeding.124 
Thus, on their face, both versions of the Model Code clearly 
address the question whether judges may informally consult outside 
experts: the answer is a resounding no.125 Indeed, both versions have a 
specific exception for judges seeking the advice of a disinterested 
legal expert, and impose procedural safeguards on such a practice.126 
Neither has any exception for nonlegal experts.127 
The ex parte provisions of the Model Code, however, only 
ambiguously address the question of independent library research, 
Internet searching, and the like. The spirit of the provisions certainly 
frowns upon any judicial acquisition of knowledge beyond that 
presented by the parties. Expansive interpretation of the provision to 
encompass all independent research, however, seems excessive. First, 
the rule appears directed at “communications,” as in when the judge 
acquires or receives information directly from an individual.128 Ex 
parte communications raise a number of unique concerns, including 
the absence of a citable and publicly available record, as discussed in 
 
 123. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3B(7) (1990). 
 124. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3A(4) (1972). The 1972 Code nominally 
uses the hortatory “should” as opposed to the mandatory “shall,” but most courts have 
interpreted the 1972 Code’s “should” as a mandatory duty. Abramson, supra note 117, at 1353 
n.20 (noting that the 1990 Code’s preamble indicates that the change to “shall” was intended to 
emphasize its mandatory nature). 
 125. Technically, “ex parte communications” only cover those communications made on 
behalf of one side in a proceeding. Informal consultations with experts therefore fall under the 
“other communications” prohibition of the provision. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL 
CONDUCT Canon 3B(7) cmt. (1990) (“The proscription against communications concerning a 
proceeding includes communications from lawyers, law teachers, and other persons who are not 
participants in the proceeding . . . .”); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3A(4) cmt. 
(1972) (same). 
 126. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3B(7)(b) (1990) (permitting a judge 
to “obtain the advice of a disinterested expert on the law” if the judge provides notice to the 
parties and an “opportunity to respond”); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3A(4) 
(1972) (same). 
 127. See also JEFFREY M. SHAMAN ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS § 5.07, at 173 
(3d ed. 2003) (noting that the exception for legal experts “does not extend to experts in other 
areas”). 
 128. See E. WAYNE THODE, REPORTER’S NOTES TO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 53 
(1973) (noting that the drafters of the 1972 Model Code were concerned about informal phone 
calls between a judge and a professor). 
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Part II.C, and a lack of reliability owing to their informality and the 
diminished accountability of the speaker.129 Published works, whether 
in print or on the Internet, generally raise fewer of these concerns, 
although perhaps the difference is only one of degree. 
Second, an overly expansive interpretation would clash with the 
well-established ability of judges to do independent legal research.130 
A few judges and commentators have advocated against such 
practices,131 but the prerogative of the judge to search the case law 
independently and to consult legal treatises is soundly entrenched, 
presumably to promote uniformity and accuracy in legal 
interpretation.132 
2. Independent Factual Investigations.  The commentary to the 
1990 Model Code provides an additional lens through which to 
analyze the independent research issue.133 Specifically, the 
commentary to Canon 3B(7) states: “A judge must not independently 
investigate facts in a case and must consider only the evidence 
presented.”134 A recent draft of the proposed revision of the Model 
Code clarifies the prohibition one step further, noting that it “extends 
to information available in all mediums, including electronic ones.”135 
 
 129. Abramson, supra note 117, at 1373–74. 
 130. E.g., Clicks Billiards Inc. v. Sixshooters Inc., 251 F.3d 1252, 1267 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting 
that a judge can independently research law, but not facts). 
 131. See D. Scott Crook, Affirming the Untested—Affirming a Trial Court Based on Issues 
Raised Sua Sponte, 14 UTAH B.J. 10, 14 (2001) (arguing that sua sponte affirmance is 
inappropriate); Adam A. Milani & Michael R. Smith, Playing God: A Critical Look at Sua 
Sponte Decisions by Appellate Courts, 69 TENN. L. REV. 245, 247, 263 (2002) (criticizing sua 
sponte decisions); Barry A. Miller, Sua Sponte Appellate Rulings: When Courts Deprive 
Litigants of an Opportunity to Be Heard, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1253, 1297 (2002) (advocating 
that litigants be given notice and an opportunity to be heard when a court raises a legal issue sua 
sponte). 
 132. See Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Scalia, J.) (noting that 
although courts are not “self-directed boards of legal inquiry and research,” they are “not 
precluded from supplementing the contentions of counsel through [their] own deliberation and 
research”). 
 133. Technically, the commentary is not “authoritative,” but merely “provides guidance 
with respect to the purpose and meaning of the Canons and Sections.” MODEL CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT pmbl. (1990). Nonetheless, it offers further explanation for the doctrinal 
tension faced by judges. 
 134. Id. Canon 3B(7) cmt. No analogous language appears in the original 1972 version. 
 135. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.10 cmt. 8 (Preliminary Draft 2005). The 
proposed revision elevates the prohibition on independent factual investigations to a full rule. 
See id. R. 2.10.B. 
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This fragment of commentary is perhaps the greatest obstacle to 
independent research. After all, researching whether a drug causes a 
particular disease, or whether a forensic technique is reliable, is 
arguably a factual investigation. Accordingly, Judge George Marlow 
has suggested that the prohibition on independent factual 
investigation makes the propriety of library research doubtful.136 
One possible problem with this interpretation stems again from 
the legislative-adjudicative fact distinction. There is little doubt that 
the prohibition on factual investigations is primarily directed at 
adjudicative facts.137 Whether the prohibition encompasses legislative 
facts, and by extension general scientific facts used to make 
admissibility decisions, is unclear. The Model Code, unlike the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, however, does not distinguish between 
types of facts. 
D. Prior Knowledge and the “Ideal Decisionmaker” 
The case law on independent research is conflicting, and the texts 
of the evidentiary and ethical rules are largely indeterminate. 
Moreover, the spirits of the two sets of rules seem to be in tension 
with each other. Resolving the question of independent research 
therefore requires a broader interpretive approach, one that takes 
into account underlying policies and related statutes that may help 
inform the discussion. One potentially fruitful approach is to consider 
what the legal system regards as the “ideal decisionmaker.” More 
specifically, whether independent research is permissible should 
depend on the types of knowledge that an ideal judge should and 
should not have apart from the parties. 
Thus far, the discussion has focused on whether judges can 
independently acquire information during a case. Equally important, 
however, are the kinds of information and background knowledge 
that judges can carry with them into a case. Symmetry suggests that 
both answers should be identical (or nearly so). It should not be 
legally significant whether judges learn about epidemiology at a 
 
 136. Marlow, supra note 7, at 317; see also id. at 323–25 (suggesting that the prohibition on 
independent investigation should apply to published material as well, given that one of the chief 
concerns is the inability of the parties to challenge the data). 
 137. See, e.g., ANNOTATED MODEL CODE, supra note 122, at 139–40 (describing instances of 
factual investigation, including looking at defendant’s criminal record, having a law clerk view 
defendant’s store, calling defendant’s friends to verify facts, etc.). 
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conference or whether they learn about it later by studying the 
reading materials distributed at that conference. 
The judicial ethics rules on personal knowledge and 
disqualification govern judges’ permissible prior knowledge. Canon 
3E(1)(a) of the 1990 Model Code requires judges to disqualify 
themselves when they have “personal knowledge of disputed 
evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.”138 Canon 3C(1)(a) of the 
1972 Model Code has a nearly identical provision.139 Must judges 
disqualify themselves in toxic tort cases if they have backgrounds in 
epidemiology? Intuitively, the answer would seem to be no, given that 
requiring disqualification would render the vast majority of judicial 
education programs pointless. Once again, however, the language of 
the Model Code is ambiguous. 
One potential argument is that expert knowledge is arguably not 
“personal knowledge,” at least as the term is often defined in 
evidence law.140 Scientists do not individually conduct or directly 
observe the experiments that form the basis of scientific knowledge, 
but rather read about them in books, learn about them in school, and 
so forth. From an evidentiary standpoint then, expert knowledge is 
largely hearsay, not personal knowledge. This ambiguity, however, is 
very much beside the point. Few would dispute that if a judge 
acquires knowledge of disputed adjudicative facts from another 
person (making such knowledge technically hearsay), the judge still 
runs afoul of the personal knowledge prohibition.141 As long as the 
judge learns of the facts extrajudicially, the prohibition applies.142 
 
 138. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E(1)(a) (1990); accord 28 U.S.C.  
§ 455(b)(1) (2000) (similar federal provision). Canon 3E addresses disqualification broadly with 
the vast majority of triggers involving bias, including pecuniary interest, familial relationships, 
and previous clients. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E (1990). See generally 
SHAMAN ET AL., supra note 127, § 4.10, at 126–27 (discussing rules governing prior factual 
knowledge). 
 139. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3C(1)(a) (1972) (“A judge should 
disqualify himself in a proceeding in which . . . he has . . . personal knowledge of disputed 
evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding . . . .”). As with the provisions on ex parte 
communications, the 1972 Code uses the hortatory “should” as opposed to the 1990 Code’s 
mandatory “shall.” Once again, however, courts generally interpret the 1972 “should” as 
mandatory. See supra note 124. 
 140. See FED. R. EVID. 602 & advisory committee’s note. 
 141. See, e.g., In re Bell, 373 A.2d 232, 235 (D.C. 1977) (disqualifying a judge for personal 
knowledge when a colleague told him that the defendant was guilty). 
 142. E.g., Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 550–55 (1994) (discussing the extrajudicial 
source doctrine); ANNOTATED MODEL CODE, supra note 122, at 229–30 (discussing the 
extrajudicial requirement). 
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The linchpin, once again, is whether the prohibition against 
personal knowledge extends to legislative and other generalized 
facts.143 The text of the Model Code is predictably unhelpful, but 
unlike in the independent research context, here the case law and the 
literature have solidly distinguished adjudicative from legislative 
facts. Personal knowledge of adjudicative facts is ground for 
disqualification; personal knowledge of generalized facts is not.144 
The most immediate reason for this distinction is practicality. 
Whereas few (if any) judges have prior knowledge of adjudicative 
facts in a given case, most judges have some background in a wide 
variety of areas.145 It is impractical to find judges devoid of all 
background knowledge or to expect them “to erase from memory all 
that [they have] read or experienced.”146 As Judge James Halpern 
notes, “[n]o judge comes to a case tabula rasa.”147 
If judges will inevitably bring their background and experience to 
a case, then it makes sense to permit the practice in the hope of 
promoting transparency. Prohibition or mandatory disqualification 
would encourage judges to suppress (however unsuccessfully) their 
background knowledge, making it virtually unknown and unassailable 
 
 143. James S. Halpern, Some Preliminary Thoughts on a Judge’s Look Beyond the Record 
for Evidence of Legislative Facts, 57 TAX LAW. 861, 867 (2004) (lamenting that there is “little 
authority on the subject of recusal if a judge has prior knowledge of the nonadjudicative facts of 
a case”). 
 144. See, e.g., United States v. Bonds, 18 F.3d 1327, 1331 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that 
previous attendance at a DNA conference did not constitute “extra-judicial knowledge of 
disputed evidentiary facts”); see also Ross v. Hoffman, 364 A.2d 596, 600 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1976) (“We find no error in the fact that a trial judge continues his general education by 
reading, or that his reasoning is influenced by such education or by his experiences during his 
lifetime.”). In Bonds, Judge Boggs distinguished his background, which involved a university-
sponsored DNA conference, from the one in In re School Asbestos Litigation, 977 F.2d 764 (3d 
Cir. 1992), in which the Third Circuit required recusal when the trial judge attended a 
conference “indirectly sponsored by the plaintiffs, largely with funding that he himself had 
approved,” Bonds, 18 F.3d. at 1331 (quoting In re School Asbestos Litigation, 977 F.2d 764, 782 
(3d Cir. 1992) (emphasis omitted)). 
 145. At the same time, although a judge can theoretically sequester himself and abstain 
from independent research during a trial, it would be difficult to discourage judges from 
learning about the world as a general matter. Weinstein, supra note 8, at 543 (“Isolation is 
certainly not desirable.”). 
 146. Ross, 364 A.2d at 600 (noting that such a practice would be “an absurdity”); see also 
Weinstein, supra note 8, at 543 (remarking that it would be impractical to require that judges 
never look at newspapers or other sources of information). 
 147. Halpern, supra note 143, at 867 (noting that as a result, “[n]o doubt most judges do not 
recuse themselves when they know something about technical issues before them”). 
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by the parties. A more permissive regime encourages them to make 
their background assumptions apparent. 
Regardless, it is not even desirable that judges come to a case 
tabula rasa, especially when the case involves scientific or specialized 
evidence. With adjudicative facts, the ideal decisionmaker may 
indeed be the (initially) ignorant decisionmaker because prior 
knowledge may irreversibly color the judge’s perception of the 
evidence presented.148 For example, if the judge witnessed the crime, 
the judge’s personal observations—even if influenced by impaired 
vision or based on faulty logic—would invariably trump the testimony 
of the witnesses during a bench trial. That judge is better off serving 
as a witness and allowing another, uninvolved judge to weigh the 
evidence on both sides. 
Generalized scientific facts, however, are different. First, far 
from being helpful, ignorance in the scientific context is actively 
harmful.149 As this Article has stressed, unfamiliarity with scientific 
concepts and an inability to assess expert evidence critically 
substantially increase the chance of erroneous decisions, particularly 
when judges face conflicting expert witnesses. And neither those 
experts nor counsel are likely to be helpful to a judge in developing 
those necessary skills. Second, because expert knowledge is rarely 
based on personal observation, it may have a weaker biasing effect. 
Because expert knowledge is acquired through books and classes, 
rather than directly and vividly experienced, one can speculate that 
judges will be more receptive to other evidence and more objective in 
their assessment. 
The ignorant decisionmaker does not necessarily fare better than 
the informed one on impartiality grounds. For example, one might 
argue that disqualification doctrine should strive to replicate whom 
the parties would select as an arbiter, and the parties “would choose 
an arbiter who had never commented on the matters in dispute [and] 
was unaligned with either party.”150 Whether this model properly 
applies to the scientific or any other specialized context, however, is 
dubious. First, although parties may generally prefer an 
 
 148. Cf. Israel, supra note 48, at 13 (noting that separating judges from the investigation 
function helps them withhold judgment until all angles are explored). 
 149. Cf. Siegel, supra note 49, at 196 (suggesting that courts “are generally reluctant to 
disqualify judges” for doing research that is necessary for “performing difficult judicial tasks”). 
 150. John Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging and Judge Disqualification, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
237, 249 (1987). 
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unknowledgeable person for deciding a purely factual dispute, parties 
often choose arbitrators with knowledge and experience when a case 
involves a specialized field. Parties do not pick arbitrators in patent or 
commercial law disputes from the general population, but from 
among a handful of experts in the field.151 One counterargument is the 
common belief that plaintiffs’ attorneys prefer juries and scientifically 
unsophisticated judges, who are more likely to be sympathetic to their 
clients. This argument, however, surely misses the point, because the 
arbitrator model operates ex ante under a veil of ignorance. Absent 
advance knowledge of the strength of their tort case or whether they 
will be plaintiff or defendant, parties would likely prefer a 
scientifically knowledgeable judge over an ignorant one. 
Even if the parties indeed preferred an uninformed judge, it is 
not at all clear that the legal system should permit party preference to 
drive the choice of decisionmaker in the context of generalized facts. 
Recall again that generalized scientific facts have precedential value, 
and that the litigation is therefore not wholly owned by the parties. If 
so, then just as the parties have no right to specify the legal rule 
governing their case, limits may be placed on the extent to which the 
parties can select the decisionmaker’s level of knowledge.152 Indeed, 
one example of this phenomenon is judicial notice of adjudicative 
facts. Although the underlying theory of judicial notice is 
controversial, most legal actors agree that at a minimum a court is 
empowered to independently find adjudicative facts that are 
“indisputable.”153 The reason is that, first, all judges are assumed to 
have a “fund of general information . . . [that] all reasonably well-
informed persons”154 have, and, second, allowing parties to control 
fact-finding in these instances would “risk[] an obviously erroneous 
 
 151. E.g., Gregg A. Paradise, Arbitration of Patent Infringement Disputes: Encouraging the 
Use of Arbitration Through Evidence Rules Reform, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 247, 248 (1995) 
(arguing that one of the chief benefits of patent arbitration is “the ability to select arbitrators 
who are experts and are familiar with the subject matter of the dispute”). 
 152. One notable exception is the ability of the plaintiff to choose either a jury or bench 
trial. 
 153. E.g., Morgan, supra note 99, at 273 (arguing that indisputable facts are subject to 
judicial notice because the parties cannot be allowed to lead the court to an obviously false 
result); see also John T. McNaughton, Judicial Notice—Excerpts Relating to the Morgan-
Wigmore Controversy, 14 VAND. L. REV. 779, 787 (1961) (including “indisputable adjudicative 
facts” among a taxonomy of the various facts that can be judicially noticed); Kenneth Culp 
Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 945, 945–46 (1955) (criticizing the Morgan view 
embodied in the Model Code of Evidence as being overly narrow). 
 154. Morgan, supra note 99, at 272. 
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finding arguably leading to injustice in the particular case and 
certainly making the court appear ridiculous.”155 
If a judge may bring scientific and other specialized background 
into litigation, it stands to reason that an initially uninformed judge 
should be able to acquire the same knowledge during litigation. To 
the extent that the judicial ethics rules strive to attain an “ideal 
decisionmaker,” whether the judge acquires generalized knowledge 
before or during a case should make no difference. In either case, the 
judge will use that knowledge to inform judicial decisions, hopefully 
making them more accurate. 
A likely objection to this “ideal decisionmaker” view of judicial 
ethics is that it neglects the importance of timing. For example, one 
might argue that independent research differs from prior knowledge 
because it gives an appearance of bias. Although background 
knowledge may be inevitable, conducting independent research is 
not, and the party harmed by a judge’s research may feel that the 
judge is targeting or sandbagging him. This objection has validity, but 
limiting independent research to generalized facts and requiring 
judges to offer parties a meaningful opportunity to be heard should 
considerably alleviate the concern.156 Digging up case-specific facts 
could certainly seem like targeting, but reading general material to 
become a better-educated decisionmaker seems far more benign. 
Furthermore, so limited, any unfairness associated with independent 
research begins to approximate that associated with prior knowledge. 
And an objection to prior scientific knowledge would be completely 
at odds with the multitude of judicial education programs that have 
been sanctioned and actively promoted by the courts. 
E. Clarifying the Doctrine 
To the extent that the concept of an “ideal decisionmaker” 
motivates the law, the existing statutory framework may permit 
independent research in the scientific admissibility context. To 
minimize uncertainty, however, the rule governing independent 
research should not be left to future interpretation or common law 
development—after all, the existing precedent is already split. 
Instead, the drafters of the latest revision of the Model Code of 
 
 155. McNaughton, supra note 153, at 788. 
 156. See supra Part II.C. 
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Judicial Conduct should explicitly authorize independent research. 
Clarification of the evidentiary rules could be helpful as well. 
In any event, absent binding precedent to the contrary, judges 
should conduct independent research when confronted with Daubert-
type issues. Such research promotes more informed and accurate 
decisions, and contrary to what some might argue, does not violate 
the principles that motivate the canons of judicial ethics. 
IV.  INDEPENDENT RESEARCH IN OPERATION 
As tempting as it may be to conclude with a proposed statutory 
reform, doing so would leave the analysis incomplete. Even if the 
evidentiary and judicial ethics codes were amended explicitly to 
permit independent research—itself a Herculean task—history 
teaches that doctrine alone is not enough, particularly when dealing 
with judicial practice. Reforms in this area will require, above all, 
sympathetic judicial attitudes and norms to be successful.157 
A few examples illustrate the importance of judicial norms, 
especially in trying to implement reforms that require active, 
inquisitorial-type behavior like independent research.158 As 
mentioned in Part I.B, under Federal Rule of Evidence 706 and some 
thirty state provisions, judges are allowed to use court-appointed 
experts, yet they rarely do so.159 Under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 44.1160 and some state provisions,161 judges may 
 
 157. Cf. Editorial, The Dangers of Ex Parte Communications, 74 JUDICATURE 288, 288 
(1991) (recognizing the problem of ex parte contacts is “less one of improving the written rule 
than of spreading the word more widely”). 
 158. See Gross, supra note 23, at 1197–98 (arguing that court-appointed expert provisions 
are neglected because of an adversarially focused judicial outlook); Stephan Landsman, Of 
Witches, Madmen, and Products Liability: An Historical Survey of the Use of Expert Testimony, 
13 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 131, 156 (1995) (suggesting that inquisitorial-type reforms are unlikely to 
succeed “any time soon”). 
 159. See KAYE ET AL., supra note 52, § 10.4.1, at 348 (noting that judges rarely appoint 
experts); Gross, supra note 23, at 1191 (same); cf. John Henry Merryman, Foreign Law As a 
Problem, 19 STAN. J. INT’L L. 151, 165 (1983) (reporting that “no expert witness, lawyer, or 
judge showed any . . . sensitivity to the possibility of a court-appointed expert” in the foreign law 
context). 
 160. FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1; see also Grand Entm’t Group, Ltd. v. Star Media Sales, Inc., 988 
F.2d 476, 488 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting that an appellate court “may do [its] own supplemental 
research” concerning issues of foreign law); Twohy v. First Nat’l Bank of Chi., 758 F.2d 1185, 
1193 (7th Cir. 1985) (“[T]rial and appellate courts are urged to research and analyze foreign law 
independently.”). See generally Arthur R. Miller, Federal Rule 44.1 and the “Fact” Approach to 
Determining Foreign Law: Death Knell for a Die-Hard Doctrine, 65 MICH. L. REV. 613 (1967) 
(discussing the history and reasons behind Rule 44.1). 
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independently raise and research foreign law issues.162 Courts, 
however, have tended either to interpret those provisions narrowly163 
or to find ways to avoid the foreign law issue altogether.164 Similarly, 
judges have clear authority under Federal Rule of Evidence 614 to 
call and actively question witnesses;165 that power remains 
“substantially unused in United States courts.”166 
Can independent research be a success in practice? Or will it be 
neglected as so many other evidence reforms have been before it? 
This Part argues that based on the survey results in Part II.A, a 
sizable number of judges may choose to engage in independent 
research, making it potentially influential for improving scientific 
decisionmaking. The survey suggests, however, that a large number of 
judges will also refuse to conduct independent research. 
 
 161. E.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4511(d) (McKinney 2005) (permitting the court to consider material 
“discovered through its own research” when taking judicial notice of a foreign law); VA. CODE 
ANN. § 8.01-386 (2005) (authorizing the court to consult any book, record, register, journal, or 
other official document “to ascertain foreign law”). 
 162. Judges, of course, are always permitted to research the laws of their jurisdictions 
independently, but traditionally (i.e., prior to Rule 44.1) foreign law was an issue of fact for the 
jury. Miller, supra note 160, at 617. 
 163. Arams v. Arams, 45 N.Y.S.2d 251, 253–54 (Sup. Ct. 1943) (allowing a judge to 
supplement the parties’ presentation of foreign law, but not to invoke a foreign law issue when 
not raised by the parties); Stephen L. Sass, Foreign Law in Civil Litigation: A Comparative 
Survey, 16 AM. J. COMP. L. 332, 345 (1968) (interpreting Arams more broadly as the court 
“refus[ing] to apply foreign law on [its] own volition” despite statutory language to the 
contrary); Arthur Nussbaum, Proof of Foreign Law in New York: A Proposed Amendment, 57 
COLUM. L. REV. 348, 349 (1957) (reporting that few courts used the foreign law research 
provision after Arams). 
 164. See Euromepa S.A. v. R. Esmerian, Inc., 51 F.3d 1095, 1099 (2d Cir. 1995) (“We think 
that it is unwise—as well as in tension with the aims of [the statute]—for district judges to try to 
glean the accepted practices and attitudes of other nations from what are likely to be conflicting 
and, perhaps, biased interpretations of foreign law.”); Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 
N.A., 660 F.2d 854, 860 (2d Cir. 1981) (applying forum law rather than the proper Vietnamese 
law because the parties did not object). But see Roger J. Miner, The Reception of Foreign Law 
in the U.S. Federal Courts, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 581, 583 (1995) (criticizing this practice and 
arguing that a “court has the affirmative obligation to seek out the applicable foreign law 
whether the parties have established that law or not”). 
 165. FED. R. EVID. 614 (allowing judges to call their own witnesses and interrogate witnesses 
called by the parties). 
 166. Alfred Gitelson & Bruce L. Gitelson, A Trial Judge’s Credo Must Include His 
Affirmative Duty to Be an Instrumentality of Justice, 7 SANTA CLARA LAW. 7, 13–14 (1966) 
(discussing the reluctance of California judges to question witnesses); John C. Reitz, Why We 
Probably Cannot Adopt the German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 75 IOWA L. REV. 987, 992 
(1990) (declaring Rule 614 to be a “striking example of the power of culture to override positive 
law”); see also United States v. Filani, 74 F.3d 378, 383–85 (2d Cir. 1996) (acknowledging the 
power of judges to ask questions, yet carefully limiting it and citing commentators who are 
strongly against it). 
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Given that judicial practice in this area may remain inconsistent, 
this Part considers whether variations in judicial practice are 
legitimate. The rule of law seems to demand uniformity, but the legal 
system seems to tolerate heterogeneity on certain occasions. 
Independent judicial research appears to be one of those atypical 
instances. 
A. Adoption and Resistance 
Predicting what judges would do if the rules governing 
independent research were clarified is obviously difficult, but there is 
reason for optimism. The survey data from Figure 1 (replicated below 
for convenient reference) suggest that significant numbers of judges 
will indeed conduct independent research. Over 40 percent of judges 
believe that reading journal articles is either somewhat or very 
desirable. These judges may already be engaging in independent 
research, but if not, they will probably do so once the statutory 
ambiguities and their corresponding chill are eliminated. With 
independent research, favorable attitudes are especially likely to 
translate into action—as opposed to reliance upon court-appointed 
experts, for example—because doing independent research involves 
little administrative hassle and is an almost natural reaction to 
confronting new and unfamiliar material. 
Figure 1 (revisited).  Desirability of Judges Independently Reading 
Medical Journals 
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At the same time, however, one should not forget that a sizable 
percentage of judges also oppose independent research, classifying it 
as either somewhat or very undesirable. These judges are likely to 
resist any statutory reform. Especially if independent research is 
consigned to the discretion of the judge, there is no reason to think 
these judges will suddenly engage in the practice. 
Will the judges change their minds over time? The increased use 
of independent research, coupled with a rule clearly allowing the 
practice, has the potential to change judicial norms, particularly for 
the more than 20 percent of judges maintaining a neutral or 
undecided position. Judges holding more extreme positions, however, 
are far less likely to change. This entrenchment is not so much an 
issue of judicial rigidity (although that may have some influence) as it 
is a function of why the issue of independent research divides judges 
in the first place. The current schism in the judiciary is not the result 
of differing personal preferences, but rather a clash between deeply 
held and opposing beliefs about the fundamental role of the judge. 
As Judge Joseph Colquitt once explained, there are two principal 
theories of adjudication. “One theory is that the litigants control the 
lawsuit and determine the issues to be decided. The other view is that 
courts have the ultimate responsibility to decide cases regardless of 
whether the appropriate issues are addressed by the litigants.”167 
Judges who subscribe to the first theory place adversarial system 
values and norms of passive judging first. They probably make up the 
majority of judges who strongly oppose independent research. 
Conversely, judges who subscribe to the second theory place greater 
emphasis on decisional accuracy and may also sympathize with recent 
trends toward active judging. They likely make up most of judges who 
support independent research. 
Argue as one might for judges to value accuracy over adversarial 
values in the scientific evidence context, the battle is likely to 
continue indefinitely. In the name of greater accuracy, some judges 
are willing to sacrifice adversarial values; some are not. 
 
 167. Joseph A. Colquitt, Judicial Use of Social Science Evidence at Trial, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 
51, 74 (1988); see also State v. Holmes, 315 N.W.2d 703, 707 (Wis. 1982) (referencing the “two 
apparently inconsistent theories of the proper role of [a] trial” in the context of a court raising 
constitutional issues sua sponte); Marlow, supra note 7, at 328–29 (discussing Colquitt). 
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B. Inconsistency and Its Legitimacy 
Although the conflict between adversarial and accuracy-oriented 
judges may be informative as a descriptive matter, it raises a deeper 
theoretical issue. When may judicial practice be legitimately 
inconsistent? After all, the rule of law suggests that whether a judge 
engages in independent research should depend on the rule, not on 
personal preference. The seemingly permanent divide among jurists 
regarding independent research would therefore seem to be cause for 
concern. This Section maintains that although these inconsistency 
concerns may be understandable, they are unwarranted in the 
independent research context. 
1. The Value of Uniformity.  Uniformity and consistency in 
treatment are often thought to be fundamental elements of the rule of 
law.168 And although the goal of treating like cases alike may not 
always be achieved in actuality, it certainly persists as an ideal. Cases 
should be decided on their merits, and procedures should remain 
consistent from one case to another.169 
A corollary to this ideal is that the particular judge or 
decisionmaker assigned to a case should make little or no difference 
in the outcome.170 Reform efforts have thus focused on eliminating 
excessive variation in areas such as sentencing171 and pain and 
suffering damages.172 A desire for greater consistency also in large 
 
 168. E.g., Thomas O. Main, Procedural Uniformity and the Exaggerated Role of Rules: A 
Survey of Intra-State Uniformity in Three States That Have Not Adopted the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 46 VILL. L. REV. 311, 311 (2001) (remarking that the ideal of consistency is so 
“deeply . . . embedded” that “many proceduralists find it difficult or unnecessary to explain why 
uniformity is thought to be good”). 
 169. Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, 
and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2047 (1989) (questioning whether 
“uniformity of result” can be achieved if procedures are allowed to vary). 
 170. See William C. Whitford, The Rule of Law, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 723, 727. But see Erwin 
Chemerinsky & Barry Friedman, The Fragmentation of Federal Rules, 46 MERCER L. REV. 757, 
782 (1995) (suggesting that the desire for “fungibility among judges” can be unrealistic). 
 171. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 365 (1989) (describing the sentencing 
disparities and inconsistencies that motivated the establishment of the Sentencing Guidelines). 
 172. Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling “Pain and 
Suffering,” 83 NW. U. L. REV. 908, 908 (1989) (discussing the problem of unpredictable tort 
awards). 
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part motivates appellate review and various uniform code efforts, 
perhaps most famously the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.173 
Variations among judges in their willingness to engage in 
independent research seems to fly in the face of this ideal, because 
whether or not a litigant faces a judge who performs independent 
research will depend on the luck of the draw. The values of 
consistency and uniformity therefore militate against a permissive 
rule for judicial research and in favor of a mandatory one. They might 
also argue for greater appellate (or other) regulation of judicial 
behavior. 
2. Inconsistency in the Legal System.  A closer look at the legal 
system, however, shows that inconsistency is not unique and that a 
range of judicial attitudes toward independent research is not all that 
troubling. The legal system tolerates—or in some cases, actively 
promotes—inconsistency in many areas of judicial practice.174 For 
example, judges frequently and vociferously disagree about the 
propriety of using legislative history in statutory interpretation. Some 
judges forswear its use except as a last resort, whereas others 
advocate for its unregulated use.175 Although some commentators 
have criticized the lack of rules in this area,176 no one seems to suggest 
that the inconsistency is illegitimate.177 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide an even richer and 
more instructive example of inconsistency. The Federal Rules, of 
course, were supposed to have standardized procedural practice in 
the federal courts. Recent experience, however, suggests otherwise. 
 
 173. Until 1872, individual judges and district courts had the power to specify their own 
rules of procedure. This fragmentation led to the 1872 Conformity Act, in which Congress 
attempted to tie federal district court practice to local state procedural practice. Only the 1938 
Federal Rules made federal procedural practice, for all intents and purposes, uniform. See 
generally Richard L. Marcus, Slouching Toward Discretion, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1561, 
1581–82 (2003) (discussing the history of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). 
 174. For example, the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 specifically encouraged local 
inconsistencies in an attempt to develop solutions that would reduce litigation cost and delay. 
Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA), Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990). 
 175. See W. David Slawson, Legislative History and the Need to Bring Statutory 
Interpretation Under the Rule of Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 383, 385–88 (1992) (summarizing the 
spectrum of positions on legislative history). 
 176. E.g., id. at 383. 
 177. But see Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 
HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2088 (2002) (noting that the “central imperative of statutory 
interpretation” is “a single, predictable, coherent set of rules”). 
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Despite Rule 83,178 which explicitly forbids district courts and judges 
from establishing local or standing rules inconsistent with the Federal 
Rules,179 conflicting rules have proliferated.180 Most famously, the 
Local Rules Project of the Judicial Conference cataloged eight 
hundred potentially conflicting local rules.181 
Additional procedural examples further illustrate the lack of 
uniformity in federal procedure. One would expect that the number 
of jurors on a jury would surely be standardized, but this is not so 
under Rule 48, which states that a “court shall seat a jury of not fewer 
than six and not more than twelve members.”182 Indeed, the Judicial 
Conference rejected a proposal setting jury size at twelve in favor of 
the more flexible current provision,183 and Professor Judith Resnik 
reports that even when local rules specified six or twelve member 
juries, judges often allowed deliberation with numbers in between.184 
The same inconsistency surrounds Rule 47, which addresses voir 
dire, Rule 11, which governs attorney sanctions, and Rule 26, which 
handles discovery. Although 60 percent of federal judges allow party 
involvement in voir dire, judges specifically rejected an amendment to 
 
 178. FED. R. CIV. P. 83. 
 179. Much of the focus in civil procedure circles has been on local rules passed by district 
courts. However, standing orders from individual judges are also a considerable part of the 
phenomenon. E.g., Myron J. Bromberg & Jonathan M. Korn, Individual Judges’ Practices: An 
Inadvertent Subversion of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 68 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1, 1–2 
(1994) (observing that judges are increasingly promulgating their own individual rules); A. Leo 
Levin, Local Rules As Experiments: A Study in the Division of Power, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1567, 
1570–71 (1991) (noting that standing orders from judges are part of the procedural mix). 
 180. See Bromberg & Korn, supra note 179, at 10 (“Local innovation has reached the point 
where almost every district and every judge has a different procedure regulating motion 
practice.”). 
 181. COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF 
THE U.S., REPORT OF THE LOCAL RULES PROJECT 1–7 (1988) (finding five thousand local rules, 
many of which conflicted with the Federal Rules), cited in Marcus, supra note 173, at 1583 & 
n.84; Subrin, supra note 169, at 2020 (same). 
 182. FED. R. CIV. P. 48; see also Judith Resnik, Changing Practices, Changing Rules: Judicial 
and Congressional Rulemaking on Civil Juries, Civil Justice, and Civil Judging, 49 ALA. L. REV. 
133, 137 n.6 (1997) (discussing a failed Advisory Committee proposal that would have fixed jury 
membership at twelve). 
 183. Resnik, supra note 182, at 146. 
 184. Id. at 143 n.27. In 1972, despite a federal rule specifically requiring empanelment of 
twelve jurors, fifty-four districts permitted the use of six-member juries. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 
U.S. 149, 150 n.1 (1973), cited in Resnik, supra note 182, at 139–40. 
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Rule 47 that would have standardized the practice.185 Rule 11 was 
amended in 1983 to require the imposition of attorney sanctions 
under a more objective standard.186 For a variety of reasons, including 
its increasing use as a litigation weapon,187 Rule 11 was ultimately re-
amended in 1993 to be more discretionary, with many commentators 
praising the change.188 Rule 26 requires the initial disclosure of certain 
materials (without request) as part of discovery,189 but has an opt-out 
provision that has resulted in “a crazy quilt of procedures that var[y] 
not only district by district, but judge by judge.”190 
3. A Functional Analysis.  The legal system, then, does not 
always promote uniformity. Sometimes inconsistency is inevitable; 
sometimes inconsistency is necessary to promote other values or 
goals. Thus, in analyzing independent judicial research, it is important 
to weigh the costs and benefits of achieving consistency, rather than 
valuing it merely for its own sake.191 Consistency may more often than 
not be a worthy goal, but that observation justifies only a 
presumption in its favor.192 
 
 185. Resnik, supra note 182, at 149 n.42; see also Marcia Coyle, Rules Would Expand Voir 
Dire, Civil Jury Size, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 11, 1996, at A12 (discussing controversy surrounding 
proposed rule change). 
 186. E.g., Marcus, supra note 173, at 1594; Judith A. McMorrow, The (F)Utility of Rules: 
Regulating Attorney Conduct in Federal Court Practice, 58 SMU L. REV. 3, 45 (2005). 
 187. Danielle Kie Hart, Still Chilling After All These Years: Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure and Its Impact on Federal Civil Rights Plaintiffs After the 1993 Amendments, 37 
VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 10–11 (2002) (discussing the use of “Rule 11 as a strategic weapon” and its 
chilling effects on litigation). 
 188. Marcus, supra note 173, at 1594 n.131, 1596 (suggesting that discretion may be more 
appropriate for sanctions than a rigid rule). Ironically, the U.S. House of Representatives 
passed legislation in 2006 that will amend Rule 11 for a third time, once again removing judicial 
discretion. See Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act of 2005, H.R. 420, 109th Cong. § 2 (2006). The 
legislation currently awaits Senate approval. 
 189. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(1). 
 190. Marcus, supra note 173, at 1585. 
 191. See, e.g., Chemerinsky & Friedman, supra note 170, at 759 (asking the baseline question 
of whether consistency in procedure is desirable); Main, supra note 168, at 317 (remarking that 
there is often little discussion on why uniformity is good); Subrin, supra note 169, at 2001 
(noting that the sponsors of the Rules Enabling Act never explained why uniformity was 
desirable and treated it as “as if it were a transcendental good whose inherent value required no 
explanation”). 
 192. John E. Coons, Consistency, 75 CAL. L. REV. 59, 108 (1987); see also Lea Brilmayer, 
Wobble, or the Death of Error, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 363, 373 (1986) (acknowledging that other 
considerations can override the desire for consistency). 
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The classic reason for promoting uniformity—the perceived 
unfairness associated with having outcomes depend on a particular 
judge193—is attenuated in the independent research context. First, 
independent research is largely procedural rather than substantive. 
Unlike substantive legal rules, sentencing decisions, and damage 
calculations, the choice to engage in independent research does not 
directly alter substantive rights and instead only influences the 
decisionmaking process.194 Second, whereas some procedural rules 
have substantive effects, independent research arguably has no 
substantive bias, at least among resource-matched parties. It is 
therefore unlike other procedural rules, including Daubert, that 
disproportionately favor or disfavor certain litigants or types of cases. 
Independent research, of course, does have the ability to favor 
resource-constrained tort plaintiffs and criminal defendants who 
cannot afford to hire experts, but that “bias” is hardly different than 
the indulgences currently afforded pro se litigants.195 Finally, the 
decision to engage in independent research is not outcome 
determinative. The judge must still conduct the research, and what 
that research will reveal is unknown. This situation is somewhat 
different from procedural rules such as time limits or exclusionary 
rules of evidence, whose ramifications are immediately clear. Thus, a 
judge could use his discretion to engage in research in some cases and 
not others without creating the appearance of being outcome driven. 
In short, there is less need for a rigid, bright-line rule governing 
judicial research. 
Other policy reasons for promoting uniformity also do not apply 
to the independent research context. For example, uniform 
 
 193. See Robert E. Keeton, The Function of Local Rules and the Tension with Uniformity, 50 
U. PITT. L. REV. 853, 860 (1989) (“Outcomes should not depend on the luck of the draw as to 
what judge decides the case . . . .”); Whitford, supra note 170, at 727 (“[I]t should not matter 
which judge is assigned to a particular case . . . .”). 
 194. See Marcus, supra note 173, at 1606 (arguing that procedural discretion is less 
concerning because it is “less freighted with substantive overtones” and many procedures do not 
necessarily affect outcome). But see Chemerinsky & Friedman, supra note 170, at 786–87 
(rejecting the view that variation can be tolerated for “housekeeping” procedures because they 
also have substantive effect); David P. Leonard, Power and Responsibility in Evidence Law, 63 
S. CAL. L. REV. 937, 953 (1990) (arguing that procedures are “not trivial merely because they do 
not define underlying rights”—they are “a foundational value in our legal culture”). 
 195. E.g., Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (acknowledging that pro se complaints 
are “[held] to less stringent standards”); see also Lois Bloom & Helen Hershkoff, Federal 
Courts, Magistrate Judges, and the Pro Se Plaintiff, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 
475, 486 (2002) (citing Haines). 
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procedures are often supported because they discourage forum 
shopping, save attorney time and money,196 and eliminate surprises 
and the lack of notice regarding “procedural traps.”197 Forum 
shopping, however, is less worrisome in the independent research 
context, because the variation is at the individual-judge level. 
Efficiency and notice concerns are also less relevant because 
independent research involves no attorney or party participation; 
judges conduct the research entirely on their own. 
At the same time, although one perhaps should not actively 
encourage inconsistency,198 there are good reasons for allowing 
inconsistency to persist, or at minimum, for not governing 
independent research with a heavy hand. First, because judicial 
practice is notoriously difficult to regulate, mandatory rules are 
unlikely to achieve actual uniformity. Indeed, a flat prohibition may 
do nothing but drive independent research underground.199 Many 
academics anecdotally remark that judges informally contact them for 
opinions on legal issues despite clear rules restricting ex parte 
communication.200 Would it not be preferable to make the practice 
 
 196. E.g., Chemerinsky & Friedman, supra note 170, at 783 (arguing that standardization is 
efficient for procedures); Subrin, supra note 169, at 2002 (discussing the waste of time and cost 
associated with learning multiple procedures); see also Bromberg & Korn, supra note 179, at 2 
(complaining that procedural variations among judges “make it difficult, expensive, and 
occasionally, impossible for litigants to file pretrial motions”). 
 197. See Keeton, supra note 193, at 860 (arguing that uniformity prevents surprise); 
Leonard, supra note 194, at 992 (noting that discretion and inconsistency creates a lack of 
predictability and therefore an inability to influence behavior). 
 198. One major reason for encouraging “disuniformity” is the ability to experiment with 
alternative solutions, much akin to Justice Brandeis’s argument for federalism. Levin, supra 
note 179, at 1579 (noting that inconsistency allows experimentation); Coons, supra note 192, at 
108 (same); cf. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state 
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments 
without risk to the rest of the country.”). Experimentation, however, has limited use in the 
independent research context given that the choice is largely binary (yes or no). See 
Chemerinsky & Friedman, supra note 170, at 770, 789–91 (noting that the theory of 
experimentation only works well when there is data collected and the experiments are 
structured to help researchers learn about their effects). 
 199. Cf. LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LIMITS OF LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THEIR 
INTERPRETATION (forthcoming 2008) (acknowledging that a bar on legislative history could be 
impossible to enforce because the judge never has to cite the material); Keeton, supra note 193, 
at 873 (arguing that local rules are important to fill procedural gaps, because otherwise, “judges 
will tend to do things according to patterns anyway, but sub rosa” and without notice). 
 200. See Editorial, supra note 157, at 288 (noting that ex parte rules are more often 
“honored in the breach”); Jay C. Carlisle, Ex Parte Communication by the Judiciary, N.Y. ST. 
B.J., Nov. 1986, at 12 (“[I]t is common knowledge that a judge often seeks the aid and assistance 
02__CHENG.DOC 6/7/2007  4:13 PM 
2007] INDEPENDENT JUDICIAL RESEARCH 1313 
discretionary but to mandate disclosure to the parties instead?201 It 
seems better to have transparent, reasoned opinions with varying 
degrees of independent research than sub rosa decisionmaking under 
the illusion of consistency. 
On the flip side, mandating independent research would be 
equally untenable. Affirmative duties are difficult to enforce, and 
measuring conscientiousness and zeal is nearly impossible, 
particularly when the amount of useful research that a judge can do 
varies from case to case.202 Moreover, in this context, the parties 
distinctly lack incentives to enforce any such duty. Litigants naturally 
believe that they have done a complete job, so they believe that all 
materials helpful to their position have already been represented. To 
their minds, independent research only helps their opponent, or, at 
minimum, is a loose cannon presenting too much litigation risk. 
Parties will thus rarely, if ever, want to promote it. 
Second, as Professor John Coons insightfully notes, inconsistency 
can foster discourse by allowing the controversy over independent 
research to remain apparent.203 Mandatory rules can give the illusion 
of accord and hide underlying tensions that would otherwise be 
further explored. 
 
of others outside the courtroom.”); id. at 14 (noting that the strict 1924 Canon barring all ex 
parte communications was often ignored). 
 201. Some ex parte communications provisions allow judges to contact disinterested legal 
experts, if parties are later given notice and an opportunity to respond. See, e.g., MODEL CODE 
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3B(7)(b) (1990). Many states, however, have no such exception. 
See, e.g., Ann Lousin, The New Ex Parte Communications Rule in Illinois: A Step Forward?, 19 
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1031, 1035–36 (1988) (discussing Illinois). 
 202. An exchange during 1938 debates over Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16, which 
makes pretrial conferences discretionary, illustrates this point: 
Mr. [Herbert] Bingham: As a matter of curiosity why was [Rule 16] made 
discretionary? 
[Professor Edson] Sunderland: Because if the district judges didn’t like it, it wouldn’t 
work anyway. (Laughter) 
Mr. Bingham: Why could it not have been mandatory? 
Mr. Sunderland: There is no use in making it mandatory because nothing will be 
accomplished without the sympathetic interest of the judge, and you can’t force him 
to be sympathetic. (Laughter). 
Resnik, supra note 182, at 200 (quoting RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT 
COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES 
299 (William W. Dawson ed., 1938)). 
 203. Coons, supra note 192, at 111 (noting that inconsistency can encourage participation 
and pluralism); id. at 112 (“[I]nconsistency’s most compelling claim for recognition may lie in its 
potential service to truth.”). 
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Third, the close relationship between independent research and 
the judicial process strongly cautions against the use of draconian 
methods to achieve uniformity. Unlike typical procedural or 
evidentiary rules, which focus on litigant behavior, rules governing 
independent research regulate the judge’s conduct and 
decisionmaking process. To be sure, even if independent research 
were at the core of the interpretative function—which it is not—it 
would still be subject to regulation,204 but excessive or undue 
interference raises judicial independence and separation-of-powers 
concerns. 
Finally, although not a sufficient justification by itself, making 
independent research subject to judicial discretion is perfectly in line 
with the character of modern rules of evidence and procedure. As 
Professor Jon Waltz once observed, significant discretion is given to 
trial judges under the Federal Rules of Evidence in two primary 
situations: when the rule conflicts with traditional adversarial 
values,205 or when the rule is largely procedural and demands 
flexibility.206 Independent judicial research qualifies under both. It 
sharply conflicts with the adversarial norm of party-driven proof, is 
largely procedural, and requires flexibility in application. A 
discretionary approach to independent research also matches the 
trend in civil procedure toward greater judicial discretion as part of 
the managerial judge paradigm.207 
 
 204. See Solan, supra note 199, at 13–18 (citing various statutes that preclude courts from 
considering certain types of evidence when making legal decisions, and noting that although 
such limited prohibitions are probably valid, blanket prohibitions are questionable). 
 205. Jon R. Waltz, Judicial Discretion in the Admission of Evidence Under the Federal Rules 
of Evidence, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1117 (1985) (discussing discretionary rules that “undercut[] 
[the] longstanding Anglo-American tradition of party-controlled evidence”). 
 206. Id. at 1119 (arguing that the Federal Rules of Evidence give discretion only when it was 
already present in the common law or when the rule “relates to essentially procedural matters 
as to which flexibility is practically unavoidable”). But see Leonard, supra note 194, at 966 
(arguing that discretion is infused throughout the Federal Rules of Evidence). To be sure, trial 
court rulings are normally only reviewed for abuse of discretion. The discretion ordinarily 
granted in those instances is considerably more bounded, however, given that the discretion’s 
principal function is to give the judge leeway to account for case-specific contexts. The court is 
not at liberty to dispense with the rules themselves. 
 207. Resnik, supra note 182, at 136 (describing the recent history of procedure as being 
characterized by “growing judicial discretion over civil process”); see also Keeton, supra note 
193, at 859 (noting that Rule 16 neither mandates nor prohibits pretrial settlement conferences, 
but rather is discretionary and “enabling”); Marcus, supra note 173, at 1587–89 (noting that case 
management entails more discretion because there are no right answers in case management). 
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CONCLUSION 
When writing about judges and judicial practice, one often 
wonders whether the scholarship will ultimately have any traction 
with the judges themselves. On this score, it may be appropriate to 
conclude with a brief anecdote from a recent science-related 
conference attended by both federal and state judges. During a 
breakout session, the judges asked the moderator, who was a 
scientist, for his suggestion on how they, as nonscientists, could best 
handle complex scientific evidence. The judges were in large part 
concerned with how they could protect themselves from being duped. 
The moderator responded that the judges should compile a ready list 
of eminent scientists, perhaps one or two in each major field, whom 
the judges could call for a “gut check.” 
Immediately, one of the judges protested, explaining that ex 
parte communication rules prohibited such behavior. Another judge, 
however, wondered aloud why calling the scientists would be any 
different from reading their scientific textbooks or journal articles, 
implying that the latter was permissible. On this note, yet another 
judge chimed in—she did not believe that judges could do library 
research either. A lively discussion ensued. 
As the anecdote and the survey results reported in this Article 
suggest, judges are indeed deeply concerned and divided about the 
issue of independent research. After all, it goes to the heart of their 
roles and responsibilities in the legal system. To many judges, doing 
independent research when confronted with new and unfamiliar 
material seems the most responsible and natural thing to do. To 
others, it represents the worst kind of overreaching and a threat to 
long-cherished adversarial values. 
This Article has argued that independent research is both 
desirable and permissible. Indeed, independent research carries great 
promise as a tool for helping judges decide Daubert questions and for 
improving scientific decisionmaking in the courts generally. 
Furthermore, although ultimately ambiguous, current rules seem to 
allow sufficient leeway to permit the practice. But ultimately, whether 
one agrees with its position or not, this Article’s true purpose is a 
broader one, and that is to spark greater academic and judicial 
commentary on the issue of independent research and the various 
ways to help judges make scientific admissibility decisions. 
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APPENDIX: SURVEY INSTRUMENT 
Author’s Note: As discussed in footnote 40, the results presented in 
this Article are only a subset of the total data collected in the survey. 
Portions of the survey relevant to this Article are reproduced below. 
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